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ARTICLES
FRICTION BY DESIGN: THE NECESSARY
CONTEST OF STATE JUDICIAL POWER AND
LEGISLATIVE POLICYMAKING
Michael L. Buenger *
I. INTRODUCTION
The political and policy influence of America's courts and
judges is unparalleled; no judiciary in the world wields greater in-
fluence in the governing of a nation and the fashioning of its poli-
cies. Alexis de Tocqueville's oft-quoted observation of American
public policy development is equally true today: "Scarcely any po-
litical question arises in the United States which is not resolved,
sooner or later, into a judicial question. Hence all parties are ob-
liged to borrow, in their daily controversies, the ideas, and even
the language, peculiar to judicial proceedings."1 Much of our civic
lexicon, ideas of fairness, beliefs in balancing individual rights
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1. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 357 (Francis Bowen ed., Henry
Reeve trans., Sever & Francis 1862) (1835). de Tocqueville noted,
Whenever a law which the judge holds to be unconstitutional is invoked in a
tribunal of the United States, he may refuse to admit it as a rule; this power
is the only one which is peculiar to the American magistrate, but it gives rise
to immense political influence .... The political power which the Americans
have intrusted to their courts of justice is therefore immense.
Id. at 127-28.
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and communal protections, public policies, even our private rela-
tionships, are framed by our understanding of and reliance upon
the role that the judiciary plays in governing America. 2 Given its
all encompassing personality, the exercise of judicial power has
constantly been a source of controversy, never more so than at the
present.
This article begins with a basic premise: all courts in America
make policy in the context of administering justice. 3 Courts dec-
lare rights and responsibilities and nullify the actions of govern-
ments given explicit or implied constitutional limitations on pow-
er. To argue that courts should not be involved in policy debates
and their outcomes, or that they can only do so with the express
imprimatur of the legislature, is to ignore political reality and
more than 230 years of American judicial history. America's
courts and judges have never played the role of mere umpires in
the game of public policy. While they clearly call the balls and
strikes, America's judges have also been key players, sometimes
hitting home runs,4 sometimes striking out,5 and sometimes
catching the foul balls of others.6
Much has been written on this subject, particularly regarding
the policy role of federal courts. By comparison, relatively little
has been written examining the role that state courts play in the
policy arena. One could write an extensive article simply compar-
2. To argue that the judiciary only recently entered the realm of policymaking mis-
casts 200 years of history and displays a fundamental misunderstanding of the unique role
of American courts. As Donald L. Horowitz observed,
The difference in the scope of judicial power in England and the United
States should not be exaggerated. It is primarily a difference of emphasis.
There have been periods ... of great passivity in America. But still the differ-
ence remains. What it has meant, in the main, is that American courts have
been more open to new challenges, more willing to take on new tasks. This
has encouraged others to push problems their way-so much so that no
courts anywhere have greater responsibility for making public policy than the
courts of the United States.
DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 3 (1977).
3. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 465 (1991) ("Governor Ashcroft relies
on the plain language of the statute: It exempts persons appointed 'at the policymaking
level.' The Governor argues that state judges, in fashioning and applying the common law,
make policy.") (emphasis added).
4. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
5. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 454 (1856), superseded by
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
6. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 686-87 (1974), superseded by statute,
FED. R. EVID. 104(a), Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1930, as recognized in Bourjaily v. Unit-
ed States, 483 U.S. 171, 177-79 (1987).
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ing and contrasting the different policy functions of federal and
state courts. That is beyond the scope of this article, although
some limited comparisons are necessary for context. Rather, this
article focuses more narrowly on the state courts by examining
three areas: (1) the early historical development of the judiciary's
chief policymaking power, judicial review, and its role in the state
court context;7 (2) issues of the constitutional and institutional
independence of state courts; and (3) various features in state
constitutions that vest state courts, directly and indirectly, with
significant and explicit powers of review over the actions of state
governments. Legislative deference in the state court context may
mean something entirely different than it does in the federal con-
text. By comparing the context and history of state judicial power,
the various judicial structures found in states, and the explicit
constitutional limitations placed on the power of state govern-
ments (and particularly state legislatures), one can conclude that
not all courts are created equal, and that in America not all sys-
tems of checks and balances are precisely the same.
II. STATE COURTS: THE STARTING POINT OF THE
AMERICAN JUDICIAL MODEL
A. The Evolution of American Judicial Power
Claims that courts have exceeded their role as interpreters of
law and arbiters of disputes and have gravitated into the realm of
policymaking outside the democratic process are characterized
today by catch phrases such as "legislating from the bench," or
"judicial supremacy."8 Notwithstanding such rhetorical character-
7. The concept of judicial review, usually attributed to Chief Justice John Marshall,
did not begin with Marbury v. Madison. See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803). Rather,
Marbury was a national articulation of a concept fairly well-settled in several colonies and
states before the adoption of the Federal Constitution. See David R. Marion, Judicial
Faithfulness or Wandering Indulgence? Original Intentions and the History of Marbury v.
Madison, 57 ALA. L. REV. 1041, 1043 (2006).
8. See, e.g., Jane Lampman, Bringing the Case Against Judges, THE CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Boston, Mass.), Apr. 13, 2005, at 15; Romney, Bush Contend Some Judges Go
Too Far, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 20, 2004, at B6; Lisa Porteus, 'Activist Judges' Under
Siege, FOXNEWS.COM, May 23, 2005, http://www.foxnews.comlstory/0,2933,157313,00.
html; Newt Gingrich, Remarks at the Georgetown Univ. Law Center & Am. Law Inst.,
Panel on "Fair and Independent Courts: A Conference on the State of the Judiciary" 13-15
(Sept. 28, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.law.georgetown.edulnews/documents/
CoJ092806-panel3.pdf) [hereinafter Gingrich Transcript]. In 2006, Former House Speaker
Newt Gingrich argued that "Supreme Court decisions that are 'so clearly at variance with
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izations, the fact is that unlike courts in much of Europe or else-
where, the American judiciary has always played a central role in
shaping much of the nation's public policy, frequently to the dis-
may of others.9 Thomas Jefferson challenged the policy role John
Marshall claimed for the federal judiciary. 10 Andrew Jackson de-
fied judicial authority.ll Abraham Lincoln expressed grave
the national will' should be overridden by the other branches of government." Gingrich
Urges Overriding Supreme Court, BOSTON.COM, Sept. 29, 2006, http://www.boston.com/
news/nationlwashingtonarticles/2006/09/29/gingrichurges-overriding-supremecourt/.
"What I reject out of hand is the idea that by five to four judges can rewrite the Constitu-
tion, but it takes two-thirds of the House, two-thirds of the Senate and three-fourths of the
states to equal five judges." Gingrich Transcript, at 15.
9. See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 123-24. A stranger to the American judicial
system
hears the authority of a judge invoked in the political occurrences of every
day, and he naturally concludes that, in the United States, the judges are
important political functionaries: nevertheless, when he examines the nature
of the tribunals, they offer at the first glance nothing which is contrary to the
usual habits and privileges of those bodies; and the magistrates seem to him
to interfere in public affairs only by chance, but by a chance which recurs
every day.
Id.
10. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to W.H. Torrance (June 11, 1815), http://mem
ory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/jefferson-papers/index.html (search "letter to W.H. Tor-
rance"; then follow "Thomas Jefferson to W.H. Torrance, June 11, 1815" hyperlink; then
follow "transcription" hyperlink) ("Certainly there is not a word in the constitution which
has given that power to them more than to the executive or legislative branches. Ques-
tions of property, of character and of crime being ascribed to the judges, through a definite
course of legal proceeding, laws involving such questions belong, of course, to them; and as
they decide on them ultimately and without appeal, they of course decide for themselves.
The constitutional validity of the law or laws again prescribing executive action, and to be
administered by that branch ultimately and without appeal, the executive must decide for
themselves also, whether, under the constitution, they are valid or not. So also as to laws
governing the proceedings of the legislature, that body must judge for itself the constitu-
tionality of the law, and equally without appeal or control from its co-ordinate branches.
And, in general, that branch which is to act ultimately, and without appeal, on any law, is
the rightful expositor of the validity of the law, uncontrolled by the opinions of the other
co-ordinate authorities."); see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston
(Mar. 25, 1825), http://www.memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/jefferson-papers.index.
html (search "Edward Livingston, March 25, 1825"; then follow "Thomas Jefferson to Ed-
ward Livingston, March 25, 1825" hyperlink).
11. President Jackson wrote:
If the opinion of the Supreme Court covered the whole ground of this act, it
ought not to control the co-ordinate authorities of this Government. The Con-
gress, the Executive, and the Court, must each for itself be guided by its own
opinion of the constitution. Each public officer, who takes an oath to support
the constitution, swears, that he will support it as he understands it, and not
as it is understood by others. It is as much the duty of the House of Repre-
sentatives, of the Senate and of the President, to decide upon the constitutio-
nality of any bill or resolution which may be presented to them for passage or
approval, as it is of the Supreme Judges when it may be brought before them
for judicial decision. The opinion of the judges has no more authority over
Congress, than the opinion of Congress has over the judges; and, on that
[Vol. 43:571
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doubts about the federal judiciary's meddling in national policy
questions.12 Franklin Roosevelt attempted to restructure the Su-
preme Court when it interfered with his economic policies.13 And
today, the role of the judiciary is a central consideration in policy
debates and political campaigns at both the state and national
level.14 Yet the fundamental role of the American judiciary has
remained largely intact for over 230 years. Courts exercise no
greater idiosyncratic policy function today than they have
throughout the history of the nation.15 What has changed is the
point, the President is independent of both. The authority of the Supreme
Court must not, therefore be permitted to control the Congress or the Execu-
tive when acting in their legislative capacities, but to have only such influ-
ence as the force of their reasoning may deserve.
President Andrew Jackson, Bank Veto, in MESSAGES OF GEN. ANDREW JACKSON 147, 156
(Otis Broaders & Co. 1837).
12. In his first inaugural address, President Lincoln observed:
At the same time, the candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the
Government upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevoca-
bly fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made in or-
dinary litigation between parties in personal actions the people will have
ceased to be their own rulers . . . practically resigned their government into
the hands of that eminent tribunal.
Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), available at http://avalon.law.
yale.edu/19th-century/lincoln1.asp.
13. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat on Reorganization of the Judiciary (Mar.
9, 1937) (transcript available at http://www.mhrcc.org/fdr/chat9.html) (proposing to re-
structure the courts because "[wihen the Congress has sought to stabilize national agricul-
ture, to improve the conditions of labor, to safeguard business against unfair competition,
to protect our national resources, and in many other ways, to serve our clearly national
needs, the majority of the Court has been assuming the power to pass on the wisdom of
these acts of the Congress-and to approve or disapprove the public policy written into
these laws"). Franklin Roosevelt's "court-packing plan" was in part a reaction to the
Court's decisions in Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935) (in-
validating certain wage fixing regulations as an invalid exercise of federal power) and
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 74 (1936) (invalidating the Agricultural Adjustment
Act). See Robert P. Wasson, Jr., Resolving Separation of Powers and Federalism Problems
Raised by Erie, the Rules of Decision Act, and the Rules Enabling Act: A Proposed Solu-
tion, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 519, 544-46 (2004).
14. See David G. Savage, Conservative Courts Likely Bush Legacy, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 2,
2008, at All; Terry Ganey, Blunt Judges the Judges, COLUM. TRIB., Aug. 5, 2007, http://
www.columbiatribune.com/2007/Aug/20070805Feat004.asp.
15. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325 (1985); Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), superseded by statute, FED. R. EVID. 104(a), Pub. L.
No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1930, as recognized in Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 177-
79 (1987); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), overruled in part by Gonzales v. Carhart, 550
U.S. 124 (2007), and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat.
903, as recognized in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 213-15 & n.*
(1995); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
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complexity, political context, number, and, perhaps, the polariz-
ing nature of the policy issues presented to the courts. 16 People
desire finality and predictability in their legal affairs, and the
American judicial process is designed to achieve these goals above
all else.
At the state level, the injection of the judiciary into policy ques-
tions is spurring renewed conflicts with the political branches of
government and bolstering charges of judicial overreaching.17
These emerging conflicts vary from state to state, pitting those
who believe policymaking falls exclusively within the realm of
democratic processes, that is, the legislature, against those who
see the judiciary's role more robustly, as embracing not only dis-
pute resolution and interpretation, but also fashioning remedies
that can have broad public policy implications.18 Given differing
constitutional structures, many state courts are confronting not
only substantive policy questions but also the very democratic
process by which such policy is created. More than one state con-
stitution is explicitly designed to place brakes on the legislative
policymaking process given the vast nature of state police pow-
ers.1 9 The current rancorous debate over the role of the judiciary
seldom acknowledges these different constitutional schemes and
controls that state courts are required to administer. Clearly, not
all criticism of state appellate judges is misplaced, but neither is
it accurate to portray all courts and judges as diving into the poli-
cy arena with unrestrained gusto and without constitutional
foundation. The unfortunate reality is that state legislators too
often duck the hard political, social, and cultural issues of the
day, leaving the public with few alternatives but to turn to the
judicial process.
U.S. 483 (1954); Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819).
16. This statement deserves qualifications as, arguably, the Dred Scott decision con-
tributed greatly to the Civil War, the great polarizing event in American history. See Ben-
jamin R. Dryden, Comment, Technological Leaps and Bounds: Pro Se Prisoner Litigation
in the Internet Age, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 819, 863 (2008).
17. See, e.g., Gregory J. Sullivan, Editorial, Injustice of Palimony, TIMES (Trenton,
N.J.), June 26, 2008, at A13; Debra Erdley, Reform Wary of Pa. Court, PITTSBURGH TRIB.
REV., Feb. 23, 2007, http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/search/print_494570.
html.
18. See id.
19. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 104; ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, § 19.
[Vol. 43:571
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The involvement of America's courts in substantive policy mat-
ters predates Marbury v. Madison and the adoption of the Feder-
al Constitution. 20 American judicial power is a unique amalgama-
tion of powers rooted in the nation's colonial and pre-Federal
Constitution past. This power enables courts to declare and en-
force rights and responsibilities not only between individual con-
testants, but also between individuals and their governments. 21
The courts' power relies on four essential elements for its
strength: (1) stare decisis, which promotes a consistent applica-
tion of law by requiring courts to decide similar matters similarly;
(2) the merging of equity and law into a single remedial structure,
which enables courts to fashion remedies and gives judges great
discretion in doing so; (3) the common law tradition, the basic te-
nants of which assume judges will propound law in the frame-
work of litigation independently of the legislature; and (4) separa-
tion of powers, which delineates judicial authority from
legislative and executive authority.22
This fourth element presents a problem in defining the precise
contours of the American judiciary's participation in the policy
arena. The separation of powers doctrine enshrined in the Feder-
al Constitution and all state constitutions is a far more elastic
principle than that found in continental legal systems, where the
role of adjudication is historically more aligned to Thomas Jeffer-
son's vision of judges as "mere machine[s]." 23 Separation of pow-
20. See supra note 7.
21. See Valley Force Christian Coll. v. Am. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982); Alan I. Bigel, Justices William J. Brennan, Jr. and Thur-
good Marshall on Capital Punishment: Its Constitutionality, Morality, Deterrent Effect,
and Interpretation by the Court, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 11, 23 (1994).
22. See Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis As a Constitutional Requirement, 104 W. VA. L.
REV. 43, 91-92 (2002).
23. "Let mercy be the character of the lawgiver, but let the judge be a mere machine."
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton (Aug. 26, 1776), http://avalon.law.
yale.edul18th century/let9.asp; see JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION
(Stanford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1985) (noting that in France, the way to prevent judicial
abuses of power "was first to separate the legislative and executive from the judicial pow-
er, and then to regulate the judiciary carefully to ensure that it restricted itself to applying
the law made by the legislature and did not interfere with public officials performing their
administrative functions"); Stanley B. Lubman, Dispute Resolution in China After Deng
Xiaoping: "Mao and Mediation" Revisited, 11 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 229, 348 (1997) (noting
that the French Revolution established a system that 'limited the courts to applying the
rules enacted by the legislature; courts were otherwise 'completely forbidden to intrude
upon the policy-making function of the legislature"') (citation omitted); Keith Rosenn,
Judicial Review: Old and New, 81 YALE L.J. 1411, 1414 (1972) ("[C]ivil law countries have
adhered to a more rigid doctrine of separation of powers, in which judicial review is re-
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ers in the continental legal system is brighter, less ambiguous
than in the United States, and gives legislative and executive bo-
dies almost sole responsibility for promulgating and administer-
ing public policy.24
By contrast, American courts have continuously been far more
active and far less deferential to legislative power given the con-
stitutional structure of the government, a cultural aversion to un-
regulated majoritarian rule, a community expectation that courts
will protect the rights of individuals against unlawful intrusions
by the government, and a general societal acceptance that in a
common-law tradition courts do make law and, therefore, by ex-
tension, public policy. 25 This design of judicial power is reflected
in many present state constitutions that impose significant pro-
cedural and substantive limitations on the legislative process
while giving equally significant powers to the courts to curb hy-
per-democratic rule at the expense of individual liberty, minority
rights, public transparency, and constitutional principles. 26 In
short, a state legislature's broad policymaking powers may be
significantly constrained by constitutional restrictions expressly
designed to limit those powers. The ability to overturn legislative
policy decisions in light of these restrictions, even decisions enjoy-
ing wide popular support, is the most distinguishing characteris-
tic of American courts and pits the democratically oriented legis-
lative process against the less democratic judicial process. 27 But
what is the source of this unique understanding of judicial power?
The exact origin of the American judiciary's chief policy power,
judicial review, is not entirely clear. Its origins appear to rest in
garded as a political function for which the ordinary courts are unsuited.").
24. See Lubman, supra note 23, at 348.
25. For a discussion comparing the role of civil and common law judiciaries, see
MERRYMAN, supra note 23. Merryman notes that, unlike judges in continental Europe,
judges in the United States and England were a progressive force, frequently siding with
individuals against abusive government power. Id. at 16. "The fear of judicial lawmaking
and of judicial interference in administration did not exist. On the contrary, the power of
the judges to shape the development of the common law was a familiar and welcome insti-
tution." Id.
26. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 104 (imposing substantive restrictions on the legis-
lature); ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, § 19 (imposing restrictions on the legislature); KY. CONST. §§
54-56 (imposing restrictions on the legislature).
27. It is wrong to assert that the American judicial process is anti-democratic, particu-
larly at the state level. While juries play an intimate role in the judicial process, judicial
elections all ensure a high degree of democratic participation in the selection of those who
administer the judicial process.
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the traditional role of common law judges, 28 emerging Enlight-
enment ideas concerning government and limits on government
power, and frustrations with the arbitrariness of British rule in
the colonies, particularly, though not solely, in regard to the ad-
ministration of justice. 29 The English Act of Settlement (the
"Act") also played a key role in evolving notions of judicial power
in the colonies for two seemingly opposing reasons. First, the Act
gave judges in England the guarantee of tenure of office during
good behavior and the security of their salaries.30 In so doing, the
Act promoted independent judges, that is, judges who could de-
cide cases with reduced fear of political intimidation from the
Crown and Parliament. 31 Second, the Act did not apply to colonial
judges.32 As Blackstone noted, provincial constitutions "depend
on the respective commissions issued by the crown to the gover-
nors, and the instructions which usually accompany those com-
missions."33 The exercise of government power in the colonies was
determined by their provincial, proprietary, or charter status.34
Colonial judges, therefore, enjoyed their tenure largely through
the arbitrary pleasure of colonial authorities or the Crown.35
Judges were thus subject to the very legislative and executive in-
timidations that the Act sought to curb in England.36 The failure
28. According to Sir William Blackstone, judges were "the depositaries of the laws; the
living oracles, who must decide in all cases of doubt, and who are bound by an oath to de-
cide according to the law of the land;" judges had an obligation to declare "not that such a
sentence was bad law, but that it was not law." WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES
69-70 (Garland Publ'g 1978) (1783) (emphasis added).
29. See Jack N. Rakove, The Original Justifications for Judicial Independence, 95
GEO. L.J. 1061, 1062 (2007).
30. An Act for the Further Limitation of the Crown and Better Securing the Rights
and Liberties of the Subject, 1700 & 1701, 7 Will. 3, c.2, § 3 (Eng.). The Act of Settlement
mandated that "Judges Commissions be made Quam diu se bene Gesserint and their Sala-
ries ascertained and established but upon the Address of both Houses of Parliament it
may be lawfull [sic] to remove them." Id.; see Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the Course of the
Law: The Origins of the Open Courts Clause of State Constitutions, 74 OR. L. REV. 1279,
1297, 1300 (1995).
31. See Rakove, supra note 29, at 1063.
32. See Hoffman, supra note 30, at 1300.
33. BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at 109.
34. See id.
35. See Hoffman, supra note 30, at 1300.
36. England viewed the legal status of the colonies differently; they were dependent
independents whose purpose was primarily to serve economic needs. As Blackstone noted,
the American colonies were in the form of plantations:
And therefore the common law of England, as such, has no allowance or au-
thority there; they being no part of the mother country, but distinct (though
dependent) dominions. They are subject however to the control of the parlia-
ment; though (like Ireland, Man, and the rest) not bound by any acts of par-
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of England to extend the protections of the Act to colonial judges
was one of the chief complaints articulated in the Declaration of
Independence.37
This failure did not, however, prevent colonial judges from test-
ing the boundaries of judicial power. In one early case, William
Cosby v. Van Dam, the colony of New York's Chief Justice Lewis
Morris attacked an attempt by a newly arrived governor to alter
court jurisdiction with the goal of securing additional personal
compensation under arcane colonial rules. 38 Morris declared the
governor's act to be unlawful, holding in part:
"I take it, the giving of a new Jurisdiction in Equity by Letters Pa-
tent to an old Court, that never had such Jurisdiction before, or
Erecting a new court of Equity by Letters Patent or Ordinance of the
Governour and Council, without Assent of the Legislature, are equal-
ly unlawful, and not a sufficient Warrant to justify this Court to pro-
ceed in a Court of Equity. And therefore by the Grace of God, I, as
Chief Justice of this Province, shall not pay any Obedience to them
in that Point."3 9
Unfortunately for Morris, because the Act did not extend to co-
lonial judges, he was dismissed.40 This was but one example of
liament, unless particularly named .... The form of government in most of
them is borrowed from that of England. They have a governor named by the
king, (or in some proprietary colonies by the proprietor) who is his represent-
ative or deputy. They have courts of justice of their own, from whose decisions
an appeal lies to the king in council here in England. Their general assem-
blies which are their house of commons, together with their council of state
being their upper house, with the concurrence of the king or his representa-
tive the governor, make laws suited to their own emergencies. But it is par-
ticularly declared by statute 7 & 8 W. III. c. 22. that all laws, bye-laws, usag-
es, and customs, which shall be in practice in any of the plantations,
repugnant to any law, made or to be made in this kingdom relative to the
said plantations shall be utterly void and of none effect.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at 108-09.
37. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776). Critical provisions
in the Act of Settlement found their way into initial state constitutions. See, e.g., MD.
CONST. OF 1776 art. XXX (1867).
38. See Paul Finkelman, The Zerger Case: Prototype of a Political Trial, in AMERICAN
POLITICAL TRIALS 21, 24-25 (Michael R. Belknap ed., Greenwood Press 1981).
39. R. Carter Pittman, Judicial Supremacy in America: Its Colonial and Constitution-
al History, 16 GA. BAR J. 148, 154 (1953). When Governor Cosby demanded that Morris
justify his opinion, Morris did him one better and had Zenger publish it, resulting in a
criminal libel charge against Zenger. Id. at 154, 157. For a history on the Zenger case, see
generally A Brief Narrative of the Case and Tryal of John Peter Zenger, Printer of the New-
York Weekly Journal, N.Y. WKLY J., in The Historical Society of the Courts of the State of
New York, http://www.courts.state.ny.us/history/elecbook/zenger-tryallpgl.htm (last vi-
sited Dec. 11, 2008).
40. See Pittman, supra note 39, at 156. Other courts were confronted with arguments
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intimidation that would lend credence to broad demands for
greater judicial independence in the administration of the law. 41
Developing a coherent historical understanding of the evolution
of American judicial power is complicated by the almost complete
absence of early historical records. The development of colonial
legal systems is one of the least known aspects of American histo-
ry because judicial opinions were generally not recorded, and co-
lonial courts were initially indistinguishable from the other
branches of government. 42 Notwithstanding their attachment to
England, the legal systems in each colony, and by extension, each
state, developed largely independently from one another, framed
by the significant differences of the people and circumstances un-
der which each colony was founded.43 Although English common
law formed the principal foundation for early state legal sys-
tems,44 the states also developed independent systems of adjudi-
that the judiciary could declare invalid certain actions of government. See, e.g., Robin v.
Hardaway, 2 Va. (33 Gratt.) 109, 114 (Va. 1772). Though the court in Robin did not adopt
the position, it took note of an argument challenging a 1782 act as void:
Now all acts of legislature apparently contrary to natural right and justice,
are, in our laws, and must be in the nature of things, considered as void. The
laws of nature are the laws of God; whose authority can be superseded by no
power on earth. A legislature must not obstruct our obedience to him from
whose punishments they cannot protect us. All human constitutions which
contradict his laws, we are in conscience bound to disobey. Such have been
the adjudications of our courts of justice .... And so he concluded the act of
1782 originally void, because contrary to natural right and justice.
Id. (citations omitted).
41. See The Massachusetts Government Act (May 20, 1774), available at http://ava
lon.law.yale.edu/I8th-century/mass-gov-act.asp; see also The Administration of Justice
Act (May 20, 1774), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edull8th-century/admin of-justice
act.asp. In 1761, the Privy Council issued instructions to colonial governors prohibiting
them from approving any legislation that conditioned judicial appointment on anything
other than the pleasure of the crown. See Irving R. Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial In-
dependence, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 671, 681 (1980).
42. See, e.g., S.C. CONST. of 1776 art. XVI (1776); Government of New Haven Colony
(Nov. 6, 1643), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th-century/ctO2.asp.
43. See generally JACK P. GREENE, PURSUITS OF HAPPINESS: THE SOCIAL DEVELOP-
MENT OF EARLY MODERN BRITISH COLONIES AND THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE
(1988) (discussing the relationship between regionalism and the difference in political cul-
ture in the colonies). While the colonies enjoyed some economic and social intercourse,
government intercourse was reserved generally to communication through the various co-
lonial structures established by England. See generally id. at 7-27 (discussing the two
models of English colonization). Each colony was largely distinct in creation, government,
and culture. See generally id. Virginia was founded by a trading company under royal
charter, Massachusetts by religious exiles, Maryland by an Irish Catholic proprietor,
Pennsylvania by a religiously tolerant and pacifist Quaker, and New York by Dutch trad-
ers. See Reuben Gold Thwaites, The Colonies, in EPOCHS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 66, 81-82,
124-26, 203-04, 215-16 (Albert Bushnell Hart ed., Longmans, Green, & Co. 1894).
44. One of the first acts of the independent states was the adoption of so-called "recep-
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cation-a mixing of common law, pragmatism, religion, and sta-
tutes. The evolution of the American judiciary can only be un-
derstood in the context of colonial events-the lack of protections
offered to judges, the trampling of liberties by legislative and ex-
ecutive bodies, the interference of the crown into the independent
administration of justice, the difficulties of administering justice
across a diverse and sparsely populated territory, the need for
flexibility in merging differing colonial legal systems, and ulti-
mately, the emergence of written constitutions as supreme law
and the supreme check on previously unchecked legislative and
executive power.45 The strength and breadth of judicial review
was a direct reaction to broad distrust of unregulated majorita-
rian rule and of the concentration of power in small factions con-
trolling the reins of government through legislative assemblies.46
Depending on one's reading of history, the first expressions of
judicial review emerged in the state courts of New Jersey, Rhode
Island, Virginia, or Maryland.47 The power to declare legislative
acts void was asserted-though not followed-in New Jersey as
early as 1779 in Holmes v. Walton, a case challenging a conviction
by a jury of six, not twelve, as the Constitution of New Jersey re-
quired through an extension of English common law.48 In 1782,
tion statutes" that gave legal effect to the existing body of English common law as the
foundation for state legal systems. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. OF 1776 art. XXV (1792); N.Y.
CONST. art. XXXV (1821).
45. To accomplish the ends of Society by being equal to Contingencies infinite, demands
the deposit of power great and extensive indeed in the hands of Rulers. So great, as to rend-
er abuse probable, unless prevented by the most careful precautions: among which, the
freedom [and] frequency of elections, the liberty of the Press, the Trial by Jury, and the In-
dependency of the Judges, seem to be so capital [and] essential; that they ought to be se-
cured by a Bill of Rights to regulate the discretion of Rulers in a legal way, restraining the
progress of Ambition [and] Avarice within just bounds.
Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Edmund Pendleton (May 26, 1788), in 2 THE DEBATE ON
THE CONSTITUTION 462, 462-63 (Bernard Bailyn ed., Literary Classics of the U.S., Inc.
1993).
46. See Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1525,
1531-33 (1990). An additional check on legislative power is the executive veto, which al-
lows the executive to prevent the adoption of policy, unless a super majority of the legisla-
ture overrides the veto. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
47. See infra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
48. See United States v. Jepson, 90 F. Supp. 983, 989-92 (N.J. 1950). There is no
known written decision in the Holmes case; however, for a history of the case, see id. at
987-96. The Supreme Court of New Jersey rejected the argument that the defendant could
not be tried by a six person jury and upheld the verdict. See id. at 989-90. However, a
month later, the New Jersey legislature reversed the decision and reinstituted the right to
a twelve-person jury. See H. Richmond Fisher, The Seventh Amendment and the Common
Law, 56 F.R.D. 507, 532 n.88 (1973); see also Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 177-78 n.7
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Virginia courts accepted the concept of judicial review somewhat
temperately in Commonwealth v. Caton.49 In several cases that
followed Caton, Virginia courts were less hesitant in striking
down legislative acts on constitutional grounds.50 In 1784, a New
York court struck down a legislative enactment, resulting in a
demand that the opinion writer be removed from the bench.51
Judges in Rhode Island faced similar assaults when they at-
tempted to strike down a legislative act; the state legislature de-
manded that the judges explain their authority for such a deci-
sion.52 The issue of judicial review also arose in other states, with
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); State v. Parkhurst, 9 N.J.L. 427, app. 444 (1827) ("In lat-
er days, in the case of Taylor v. Reading, a certain act of the legislature, passed March,
1795, upon the petition of the defendants, declaring that in certain cases payments made
in continental money should be credited as specie, was by this court held to be an ex post
facto law, and as such unconstitutional, and in that case inoperative.").
49. See 8 Va. (4 Call.) 5, 17-18 (1782). The court noted:
But how far this court, in whom the judiciary powers may in some sort be
said to be concentrated, shall have power to declare the nullity of a law
passed in its forms by the legislative power, without exercising the power of
that branch, contrary to the plain terms of that constitution, is indeed a deep,
important, and I will add, a tremendous question, the decision of which might
involve consequences to which gentlemen may not have extended their ideas.
I am happy in being of opinion there is no occasion to consider it upon this oc-
casion; and still more happy in the hope that the wisdom and prudence of the
legislature will prevent the disagreeable necessity of ever deciding it, by sug-
gesting the propriety of making the principles of the constitution the great
rule to direct the spirit of their laws.
Id.; see also id. at 20 ("Chancellor Blair and the rest of the judges, were of opinion, that the
court had power to declare any resolution or act of the legislature, or of either branch of it,
to be unconstitutional and void; and, that the resolution of the house of delegates, in this
case, was inoperative, as the senate had not concurred in it.").
50. See Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 31 n.* (1792) ("To wait for the legis-
lature to decide whether the act be unconstitutional, which would be contrary to that ar-
ticle in the Constitution, which declares that 'the legislative, executive, and judiciary de-
partments shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers properly
belonging to the other.'-Since to decide whether the plaintiff or the defendant under the
existing laws have a right, is a judicial act, and to decide whether the act be a void law as
to a right vested or in litigation, is in fact to decide which of the parties have the right.")
(quoting VA. CONST. of 1776, § 16); Cases of the Judges of the Court of Appeals, 8 Va. (4
Call.) 135, 141-47 (1788); cf Turpin v. Locket, 10 Va. (6 Call.) 113, 153 (1804) (holding
that an act of assembly directing overseers of the poor to sell a glebe was valid).
51. See 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 133-37 (1971).
52. Kaufman, supra note 41, at 685. The matter involved the case of Trevitt v. Wee-
don, an unreported case from 1786 that concerned an action brought against a butcher
who refused to accept paper currency for payment of a debt. See id. To enforce the accep-
tance of its paper currency, Rhode Island empowered the judiciary to act summarily
against any person refusing payment. Id. When the case came to trial, the defendant ar-
gued that the act was unconstitutional for violating his right to a jury trial. Id. Although
the court dismissed the action for want of jurisdiction, a majority of its members were of
the opinion that the act was unconstitutional. Id. This sparked a firestorm in the legisla-
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some state courts declaring legislative acts unconstitutional,53
and other state courts upholding such acts. 54 Although the early
history is not precisely clear, what is indisputable is that judicial
review of legislative acts emerged in state courts well before its
articulation in Marbury55 and eventually formed a core principle
ture. See id. James Madison noted the Rhode Island situation in arguing for an indepen-
dent federal judiciary: '[I]n R[hode] Island the Judges who refused to execute an unconsti-
tutional law were displaced, and others substituted, by the Legislature who would be will-
ing instruments of the wicked [and] arbitrary plans of their masters."' Id. (quoting 2 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 28 (Max Farrand ed., Yale Univ. Press
1966) (1911)). Political intrusions into state judicial departments did not end with Trevitt.
Jeffersonian Republicans sought to remove Pennsylvania's Chief Judge Alexander Addi-
son, and later sought to impeach the three "federalist" judges on the state's supreme court.
For a general discussion on the Addison matter and other attempts at removing judges,
see JAMES F. SIMON, WHAT KIND OF NATION: THOMAS JEFFERSON, JOHN MARSHALL, AND
THE EPIC STRUGGLE TO CREATE A UNITED STATES 193-95 (2002).
53. See, e.g., Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. (1 Mart.) 5, 7 (1787) ("But that it was clear,
that no act they could pass, could by any means repeal or alter the constitution, because if
they could do this, they would at the same instant of time, destroy their own existence as a
Legislature, and dissolve the government thereby established. Consequently the constitu-
tion (which the judicial power was bound to take notice of as much as of any other law
whatever,) standing in full force as the fundamental law of the land, notwithstanding the
act on which the present motion was grounded, the same act must of course, in that in-
stance, stand as abrogated and without any effect."); Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199, 217
(1818) (holding that the legislature may not vacate a judgment and grant a new trial, for
to do so is unconstitutional); Emerick v. Harris, 1 Binn. 416, 424 (Pa. 1808) ("On the first
question argued in this case, I have no doubt whatever, that this court is vested with the
legitimate power of deciding on the constitutionality of an act of the legislature. The judi-
cial authority of this state comprehends the exercise of this right as well on principle as
precedent."); Turpin v. Locket, 10 Va. (6 Call.) 113, 150 (1804) ("Consequently, unless that
act be contrary to the constitution of this commonwealth, these newly incorporated bodies
are likewise dissolved.").
54. See, e.g., Symsbury Case, 1 Kirby 444, 447 (Conn. 1785) (holding that the proprie-
tors of Symsbury could not have their grant taken from them, or curtailed, even by the
general assembly); State v. Phillips, 2 Del. Cas. 200, 202 (1803) ("The Court or jury have
nothing to do with the question whether the law is impolitic or not. We are sworn and
bound to obey the laws."); Anonymous, 2 N.C. 28, 29, 39-40 (1794) (finding constitutional
an act allowing the attorney general to obtain judgments against receivers of public money
on motion and stating that the knowledge of the receivers that they possessed a deficiency
was constitutional); Perkins v. Scott, 57 N.H. 55, 55 (1876) (stating that an act of the legis-
lature providing for sending cases to auditors is not unconstitutional); Respublica v. Du-
quet, 2 Yeates 493, 501 (Pa. 1799) ("As to the constitutionality of these laws, a breach of
the constitution by the legislature, and the clashing of the law with the constitution, must
be evident indeed, before we should think ourselves at liberty to declare a law void and a
nullity on that account, yet if a violation of the constitution should in any case be made by
an act of the legislature, and that violation should unequivocally appear to us, we should
think it our duty not to shrink from the task of saying such law is void. We however see
no such violation in the present case, and therefore give judgment for the common-
wealth."); Ham v. M'Claws, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 93, 98 (1789) (concluding the forfeiture of
slaves under the 1788 act prohibiting the importation of slaves by land or water before
January 1, 1793 was not within the intention of the legislature under the peculiar cir-
cumstances of the case, as such construction would be against common right and reason).
55. See Bracken v. Visitors of William & Mary Coll., 7 Va. (3 Call.) 573, 585, 589
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of American government. 56 The desire to prevent the concentra-
tion and abuse of power by government officials cannot be unde-
restimated as a quintessential element in the evolution of judicial
review.
B. Today's Unacknowledged Role of State Judicial Power
Americans' collective understanding of judicial power is tilted
toward the role federal courts play in governing the nation. As
Justice Jackson once observed, "We are not final because we are
infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final."57 Hav-
ing the final say on matters of great national importance draws
great attention. To the public, and quite a few public officials, the
terms "judge," "court," or "judiciary" have singular meanings that
fail to consider the true nature of the American judiciary.58 Many
people see courts and judges as essentially possessing the same
powers.
This tendency to view the American judiciary almost exclusive-
ly through the lens of federal courts-particularly within academ-
ic circles-is regrettable for three reasons. First, it diminishes the
vastly important role that early state courts played in creating
(1790) ("This act, then, if the Visitors in 1779, being subversive of the charter, is a nullity;
and, of course, cannot deprive the plaintiff of his rights under the charter [of William and
Mary College] .... The act of 1779, therefore, being void, nothing exists to deprive Mr.
Bracken of his salary or his office."). Marbury was not the first expression of judicial re-
view even in the federal courts. See Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304,
309, 28 F. Cas. 1012, 1016 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (No. 16,857) (opining that a legislative act
repugnant to a constitutional principle must be rejected and that it is the duty of a court
to adhere to the Constitution and to declare such acts null and void, as "[tihe Constitution
is the basis of legislative authority ... and is a rule and commission by which both Legis-
lators and Judges are to proceed"); Minge v. Gilmour, 17 F. Cas. 440, 444 (C.C.D. N.C.
1798) (No. 9631) ("If an act be unconstitutional, it is void. If it be constitutional, it is va-
lid."). Arguably, the first assertion of judicial review by the Supreme Court occurred in
Hylton v. United States. See 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175 (1796) (declaring the federal carriage
tax constitutional).
56. See, e.g., Patrick Henry Elaborates His Main Objections, and James Madison Re-
sponds, in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 45, at 684-85 ('They [the
state courts] had fortitude to declare that they were the Judiciary and would oppose un-
constitutional acts. Are you sure that your Federal Judiciary will act thus? Is that Judi-
ciary so well constructed and so independent of the other branches, as our State Judi-
ciary?").
57. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
58. See, e.g., Rep. Ed Emery Attacks Judicial Activism, JOPLIN INDEP., (Joplin, Mo.)
Apr. 2, 2004, http://www.joplinindependent.com/displayarticle.php/e-emery1080930635
(reporting that a state representative filed a bill calling for impeachment of a federal
judge).
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the basic framework for American judicial power. The framers of
the Federal Constitution drew heavily from their state expe-
riences in structuring the national government-not the other
way around, as some may assert. 59 The basic structure of the fed-
eral judiciary was not revolutionary but evolutionary, a continu-
ing expression of thinking already alive in the states. Those who
argue that courts have entered a new and insidious era of judicial
"legislating" ignore the early historical development of America's
state courts. 60
Second, this myopic perspective on judicial power ignores the
central role state courts play in handling the overwhelming ma-
jority of the nation's litigation and the myriad policy issues that
arise in that litigation, as well as the role state courts play in ex-
ercising the vast majority of the nation's general domestic judicial
power.61 As evidenced by recent cases, state courts are on the
vanguard of some of the nation's most contentious legal and poli-
cy questions in areas such as crime and punishment,62 gay mar-
59. See, e.g., The Aspen Ideas Festival, THE ATLANTIC ONLINE (Oct, 2006), available at
www.theatlantic.com/doc/print/200610/aspen. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor observed,
"But my concern is that the Framers of our Constitution thought it was of critical, critical
importance, in establishing three branches of government, that we have an independent
judiciary, at least at the federal level; and all the states copied that model." Id. The more
accurate characterization is that the federal government, including the judiciary, was
modeled after principles existing or emerging in the states.
60. Professor Paulsen argues that:
[C]ontrary to the mythology that has come to surround Marbury, the power of
judicial review was never understood by proponents and defenders of the
Constitution as a power of judicial supremacy over the other branches, much
less one of judicial exclusivity in constitutional interpretation. Nothing in the
text of the Constitution supports a claim of judicial supremacy.
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2706,
2707-08 (2003). See generally Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Re-
view, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006) (discussing the arguments against judicial review).
61. State courts handle the bulk of the nation's litigation-almost 100 million cases
were filed in 2004. R. SCHAUFFLER ET AL., NAT'L CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING
THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2005: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS
PROJECT 14 (2006).
62. See, e.g., Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 742 (2006) (finding an Arizona insanity
test predicated solely on the defendant's ability to determine whether a criminal act was
right or wrong did not violate due process standards); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813,
822 (2006) (finding that statements are non-testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation
Clause when they are elicited in the course of a police interrogation whose primary pur-
pose is to enable police to respond to an ongoing emergency); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.
S. 586, 594 (2006) (concluding the exclusionary rule was not the appropriate remedy when
police failed to knock and announce before executing a search warrant); Kansas v. Marsh,
548 U.S. 163, 165-66 (2006) (holding the Kansas death penalty law constitutional because
the state's weighing equation merely channeled the jury's discretion in deciding whether
to impose life or death); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 559-60 (2005) (holding the ex-
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riage63 and gay rights,64 abortion,65 property rights,66 religion
and public life,67 the rights of incapacitated persons, 68 and elec-
tions. 69 While federal courts may enjoy grander stature, the
overwhelming intercourse between Americans and the judiciary
occurs before state judges. 70 Relying on the federal courts to un-
derstand judicial power diminishes the significant role state
courts play within their sphere of influence and the different con-
texts in which state judicial power is exercised.
Third, and most importantly, using the federal courts as the
focal point for understanding judicial power presumes that there
is only one judicial system in the United States, with merely a se-
ecution of underage offender unconstitutional).
63. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 399-400 (Cal. 2008) (interpreting the
California Constitution to guarantee the right to form a family, whether heterosexual or
homosexual), superseded by constitutional amendment, California Marriage Protection
Act, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; Perdue v. O'Kelley, 632 S.E.2d 110, 113 (Ga. 2006) (holding
an amendment barring same sex marriage constitutional); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (concluding a ban on same-sex marriage was not
rationally related to legitimate state interests); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 5 (N.Y.
2006) (finding same-sex marriage was not guaranteed under the New York state constitu-
tion); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 968 (Wash. 2006) (concluding the legisla-
ture has the power to limit marriage to a man and a woman).
64. See, e.g., Dep't of Human Servs. & Child Welfare Agency Review Bd. v. Howard,
238 S.W.3d 1, 3, 8-9 (Ark. 2006) (holding that a regulation banning homosexual individu-
als from being foster parents did not promote the health, safety, and welfare of children
and is unconstitutional on the basis of separation of powers), superseded by Proposed In-
itiative Act No. 1 of Nov. 4, 2008 (providing that an individual cohabitating outside of a
valid marriage may not adopt or be a foster parent of a child younger than eighteen).
65. See, e.g., Valley Hosp. Ass'n v. Mat-Su Coal. for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 965 (Alaska
1997) (holding the policy of a quasi-public hospital banning elective abortions unconstitu-
tional).
66. See, e.g., Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 225 (2006) (holding that when notice of a
tax sale is returned as unclaimed, the state must take additional steps to provide notice
before executing a sale of property); Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483-84
(2005) (finding a taking of private property through eminent domain for economic devel-
opment is a public purpose under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
67. See, e.g., Moore v. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, 891 So. 2d 848, 851-52, 854 (Ala.
2004) (finding a judge who defied a federal injunction to remove a display of the Ten
Commandments from the Alabama Supreme Court building was properly removed from
office).
68. See, e.g., In re Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding a
patient's statements to friends and family and other evidence gave the trial court suffi-
cient basis for its decision to order removal of a feeding tube); see also Bush v. Schiavo, 885
So. 2d 321, 324, 329 (Fla. 2004) (holding that a law permitting the governor to issue a stay
to prevent the withdrawal of an incapacitated person's feeding tube was unconstitutional).
69. See, e.g., Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1247 (Fla. 2000), rev'd, Bush v. Gore,
531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000).
70. Justice Stephen Breyer noted that, 'The reputation of the American judiciary is in
the hands of the state courts." Robert Barnes, Judicial Races Now Rife with Politics,
WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2007, at A01.
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ries of subcomponents largely indistinguishable from one anoth-
er.7 1 However, multiple regimes define American judicial power,
and each regime has its own principles and dynamics defined ex-
plicitly or implicitly by different constitutional considerations
that influence its practical exercise. 72 There is no universal con-
stitutional construct that defines the structure and power of state
courts, and therefore, variances among them are linked only by
broad concepts that weave their way through all state constitu-
tions as basic paradigms of American government. 73 It is, there-
fore, too simplistic to assume there is but one model for the exer-
cise of judicial power in the United States, or that the power of
courts is the same from state to state, or between the federal and
state courts. To do so conflates the American judiciary into a uni-
tary structure that simply does not exist.
Nevertheless, Americans often think of courts in a unitary
sense-that all courts essentially share the same attributes and
administer the law in a similar fashion. Such a simplistic under-
standing of judicial power is evidenced by how little Americans
actually pay attention to the diversity of their governmental in-
stitutions, including their courts. For example, federal courts are
not courts of general judicial authority in the same sense that
state courts are courts of general judicial authority. "It is a fun-
damental precept that federal courts are courts of limited juris-
diction," constrained to exercise only the authority conferred by
Article III of the Constitution and affirmatively granted by feder-
al statute.74 Every exercise of federal judicial authority must, like
71. But see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714-15 (1999). ("[Tlhe constitutional design
secures the founding generation's rejection of 'the concept of a central government that
would act upon and through the States' in favor of 'a system in which the State and Fed-
eral Governments would exercise concurrent authority over the people-who were, in
Hamilton's words, 'the only proper objects of government.' . . . [The states] are not rele-
gated to the role of mere provinces or political corporations, but retain the dignity, though
not the full authority, of sovereignty.") (citation omitted).
72. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) (stating the Supreme Court
will not review a state court decision that indicates clearly and expressly that it is based
on separate, adequate, and independent state grounds).
73. The volume of a state's constitution can impact the power and authority of state
courts, giving some state judiciaries greater powers, and others, more limited powers.
Even the processes used to select judges-from life-time appointment, to virtual life-time
appointment, to appointment and retention, to direct election (partisan and nonparti-
san)-reflects the remarkable diversity of state judiciaries. See discussion infra notes 109-
20 and accompanying text.
74. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978); see also United
States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 32-33 (1812) (noting that federal courts derive
their powers from the Constitution and Congress and retain no residual jurisdiction); Mar-
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the exercise of federal legislative power, be within the confines of
those powers delegated by the Constitution.75 Federal courts,
therefore, possess restricted judicial powers confined by the ef-
fects of specific constitutional constraints, particularly the Bill of
Rights; the principle of delegated (not general) powers; and the
vast legislative authority of Congress. 76
By contrast, states retain and exercise the majority of the na-
tion's domestic authority through their vast police powers. 77
tin v. Sallie Mae, Inc., No. 5:07-CV-00123, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90418, at *7 (S.D. W. Va.
Dec. 7, 2007) ("Federal courts cannot assume jurisdiction exists ...."), motion denied by
Martin v. Sallie Mae, Inc., No. 5:07-CV-00123, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53541 (S.D. W. Va.
July 15, 2008).
75. While the constitutional divide between federal and state power is not always
clear, the parameters of the federal judicial power are today far more defined, given their
largely statutory basis.
76. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 64-65 (1996) (explaining that
state sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on federal judicial power); Ex Parte
New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) ("[T]he entire judicial power granted by the Constitu-
tion does not embrace authority to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a
State without consent given ...."); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 14-15, 17, 21 (1890)
(noting that each state is a sovereign entity in the federal system). But see Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 447 (1976) (limiting Hans in that Congress may enforce "an award
against the State as a means of enforcing the substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment").
77. The Supreme Court has said:
The federal system established by our Constitution preserves the sovereign
status of the States in two ways. First, it reserves to them a substantial por-
tion of the Nation's primary sovereignty, together with the dignity and essen-
tial attributes inhering in that status. The States "form distinct and indepen-
dent portions of the supremacy, no more subject, within their respective
spheres, to the general authority than the general authority is subject to
them, within its own sphere." . ..The States thus retain "a residuary and in-
violable sovereignty." They are not relegated to the role of mere provinces or
political corporations, but retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of
sovereignty.
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714-15 (1999) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 194
(James Madison) (Bantam Books 1982) (1788)); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 922, 933 (1997) (holding the Brady Act violated sovereignty by compelling states to
administer a federal regulatory scheme, and the responsibility for the administration of
laws enacted by Congress belonged to the President, not state law enforcement officers);
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) ("While Congress has substantial
powers to govern the Nation directly, including in areas of intimate concern to the States,
the Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require
the States to govern according to Congress' instructions."); Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7
Wall) 700, 725 (1868) ("[T]he perpetuity and indissolubility of the Union, by no means im-
plies the loss of distinct and individual existence, or of the right of self-government by the
States .... Not only, therefore, can there be no loss of separate and independent autono-
my to the States, through their union under the Constitution, but it may be
not unreasonably said that the preservation of the States, and the maintenance of their
governments, are as much within the design and care of the Constitution as the preserva-
tion of the Union and the maintenance of the National government. The Constitution, in
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Thus, state courts exercise the nation's general judicial power.
States enjoy no delegated powers and therefore are not subject to
limitations consequential to that concept. 78 As the Supreme
Court of Missouri observed relative to legislative power, "The
state constitution, unlike the [F]ederal [C]onstitution, is not a
grant of power, but as to legislative power, it is only a limitation;
and, therefore, except for the restrictions imposed by the state
constitution, the power of the state legislature is unlimited and
practically absolute." 79 Arguably, the same can be said for state
judicial power if it is to have a meaningful role in checking legis-
lative power. Many state courts draw their powers directly from
their respective constitutions, and therefore, they are not suscept-
ible to legislative limitations in the same manner that federal
courts are susceptible to congressional limitations on substantive,
procedural, and jurisdictional matters.80 The distinction between
the delegated powers enjoyed by federal courts and the general
powers enjoyed by state courts is subtle, but also profoundly im-
portant in understanding the exercise of judicial review in the
latter's venue and its implication in the policy arena.
III. INSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE-THE FEDERAL AND
STATE COURTS COMPARED
A. Just How Independent Are the Independent Federal Courts?
The framers' assumption in drafting the Federal Constitution
was that the national government would possess limited powers,
while the states would retain the more general domestic powers
all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States."),
overruled by Morgan v. United States, 113 U.S. 476 (1885).
78. See, e.g., State ex rel. Jardon v. Indus. Dev. Auth., 570 S.W.2d 666, 673-75 (Mo.
1978) (finding constitutional an act of the state legislature and noting that other state
courts have upheld similar acts).
79. State ex rel. Danforth v. State Envtl. Improvement Auth., 518 S.W.2d 68, 72 (Mo.
1975) (citing Kansas City v. Fishman, 241 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Mo. 1951)).
80. The Supremacy Clause gives Congress some authority over substantive matters
before state courts to the extent that the matters fall within one of the delegated powers of
the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. VI; John Quigley, Toward More Effective Judicial
Implementation of Treaty-Based Rights, 29 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 552, 580 (2006). This was
controversial. Opponents of the Supremacy Clause branded it as the clause that would "be
the destruction of every law which will come in competition with the laws of the United
States." James Iredell and Timothy Bloodworth Debate the Supremency of the Constitu-
tion and of Federal Law (July 29, 1788), in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 45, at 899, 900.
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of government.8 1 This is reflected in the political concept that the
federal government enjoys its powers by delegation, while the
states enjoy their powers by limitation. Thus, federal courts-a
controversial creation at the outset 82-are limited by constitu-
tional constraints and the design of Article III, which vests Cong-
ress with significant legislative power over the federal judiciary. 83
As James Winthrop observed during the debate on the Constitu-
tion, "The rule which is to govern the new [federal] courts, must,
therefore, be made by the court itself, or by its employers, the
Congress."84
The Federal Constitution gives little hint as to the structure
and jurisdiction of the federal courts, except as to the Supreme
Court.85 The framers gave Congress very broad authority to im-
plement Article III, leaving the particulars of the federal judicial
structure and its jurisdiction to the politics of the legislative
process. 86 Only the particulars of the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court are expressed in the Constitution, and even here, Article
III, section 2 gives Congress authority to regulate the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.87 Accordingly, as a practical
matter, the Constitution imposes few limitations on Congress's
power to confer federal jurisdiction, to withdraw federal jurisdic-
tion, or even to restructure the federal judiciary.S8 In short, the
81. See James Wilson, Speech at a Public Meeting (Oct. 6, 1787), in 1 THE DEBATE ON
THE CONSTITUTION 63, 64 (Bernard Bailyn ed., The Library of America 1993).
82. See "Brutus" XI, The Supreme Court: They Will Mould the Government into Almost
any Shape They Please, reprinted in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 45,
at 129, 133. ("The [federal] judicial power will operate to effect ... an entire subversion of
the legislative, executive and judicial powers of the individual states."); see also James E.
Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality of Jurisdic-
tion-Stripping Legislation, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 191, 217-19 (2007). State courts had, prior
to the adoption of the Federal Constitution, complete and exclusive jurisdiction over all
legal disputes. See id. at 133 ("Every adjudication of the supreme court, on any question
that may arise upon the nature and extent of the general government, will affect the lim-
its of the state jurisdiction.").
83. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2.
84. "Agrippa" [James Winthrop] V, On the "Derangement" of the Federal Courts,
MASS. GAZETTE, Dec. 11, 1787, reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 81, at 474.
85. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2.
86. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 ("The Congress Shall have Power ... To constitute
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court."); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The Judicial Power of
the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.").
87. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 ("In all the other Cases before mentioned, the su-
preme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Excep-
tions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.") (emphasis added).
88. See, e.g., Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 547-48 (1989) ("It remains rudi-
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framers largely delegated the assembly and regulation of the fed-
eral judiciary to the politics of Congress and provided little insu-
lation to the federal courts from the vast legislative authority of
that body.89 The Federal Constitution, for example, contains no
''open courts" provision to act as a counterbalance to Congress's
legislative power in federal judicial matters, particularly those re-
lated to jurisdiction. 90 Many state constitutions, by comparison,
mentary law that '[a]s regards all courts of the United States inferior to this tribunal, two
things are necessary to create jurisdiction, whether original or appellate. The Constitution
must have given to the court the capacity to take it, and an act of Congress must have
supplied it . . . .To the extent that such action is not taken, the power lies dormant."'
(quoting Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 252 (1867))), superseded by statute, Judi-
cial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, as recognized in Ex-
xon Mobile Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 557-58 (2005); see also Gerald
Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated
Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 901, 905 (1984) (arguing that the Con-
stitution, as evidenced by the exceptions clause and Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
506 (1868), supports the proposition that Congress retains authority over access to the
federal courts); Stephan 0. Kline, Judicial Independence: Rebuffing Congressional Attacks
on the Third Branch, 87 KY. L.J. 679, 737 (1999). But see David Cole, Jurisdiction and Li-
berty: Habeas Corpus and Due Process as Limits on Congress's Control of Federal Jurisdic-
tion, 86 GEO. L.J. 2481, 2494-95 (1998) (arguing that due process considerations may con-
fine Congress's ability to limit access to the federal judiciary in cases challenging
detention).
89. Congress's authority regarding the federal courts is not, however, without limit.
See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 225 (1995) (finding that a judicial
decision is the last word of the judiciary with regard to a particular case or controversy,
and Congress may not declare by retroactive legislation that the law applicable to that
very case was something other than what the courts said it was); see also Charles Gardner
Geyh, Rescuing Judicial Accountability from the Realm of Political Rhetoric, 56 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 911, 918-19, 921 (2006).
90. The Supreme Court observed that:
This position has held constant since at least 1845, when the Court stated
that the "judicial power of the United States ... is (except in enumerated in-
stances, applicable exclusively to this Court) dependent for its distribution
and organization, and for the modes of its exercise, entirely upon the action of
Congress, who possess the sole power of creating the tribunals (inferior to the
Supreme Court) ...and of investing them with jurisdiction either limited,
concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in the ex-
act degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper for the public
good."
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 698 (1992) (citing Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
236, 245 (1845)); see also Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922) ("Only the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is derived directly from the Constitution. Every other
court created by the general government derives its jurisdiction wholly from the authority
of Congress. That body may give, withhold or restrict such jurisdiction at its discretion,
provided it be not extended beyond the boundaries fixed by the Constitution."); Plaque-
mines Tropical Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170 U.S. 511, 517 (1898) (noting that in defining
and regulating jurisdiction of federal courts, Congress has taken care not to exclude the
jurisdiction of the state courts from every case to which the judicial power of the United
States extends); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850) ('The political truth is
that the disposal of the judicial power (except in a few specified instances) belongs to Con-
gress: and Congress is not bound to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Federal courts to every
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contain a version of the Magna Carta's great command that
courts be open to hear and give remedy to all lawful complaints. 91
Access to state courts is, in many circumstances, subject to li-
mited legislative regulation, and most certainly not legislative
abolition. 92 Ultimately, the check on Congress's authority over
the federal courts rests more in wisdom and tradition than in any
explicit constitutional limitations on its legislative powers in this
domain.
subject, in every form which the Constitution might warrant." (quoting Turner v. Bank of
North-America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10 n.1 (1799))),
91. The Magna Carta stated that,
No free man shall be taken, imprisoned or disseised, outlawed, banished, or in any
way destroyed, nor will We proceed against or prosecute him, except by the lawful
judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. To no-one will We sell, to none will
We deny or delay, right or justice.
MAGNA CARTA, cl. 39, 40, reprinted in A.E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT AND
COMMENTARY 33, 45 (rev. ed. 1998). This is the basis of so-called modern open courts
clauses found in many state constitutions. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 14; ARIZ. CONST.
art. II, § 11; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 13; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 6; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 10;
DEL. CONST. art. I, § 9; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 18; ILL. CONST. art.
I, § 12; IND. CONST. art. I, § 12; KY. CONST. § 14; ME. CONST. art. I, § 19; MASS. CONST. pt.
I, art. 11; MO. CONST. art. I, § 14; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 16; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 13; PA.
CONST. art. I, § 11; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 20; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 11; WIS. CONST. art. I,
§ 9. Most open courts mandates are contained in the bill of rights of a state's constitution.
See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 14. These provisions are typically coupled with the language
of the Magna Carta conferring a right to remedy in due course of law or guaranteeing the
administration of justice without sale, denial, or delay. See State ex rel. Herald Mail Co. v.
Hamilton, 267 S.E.2d 544, 548 (W. Va. 1980).
92. See, e.g., McCollum v. Sisters of Charity, 799 S.W.2d 15, 18-19 (Ky. 1990) (holding
a statute of repose unconstitutional as it violated the open courts provision); Virmani v.
Presbyterian Health Servs. Corp., 493 S.E.2d 310, 315-16 (N.C. App. 1997) (finding that a
legislative act cannot supersede the constitutional right of access under the open courts
provision); Craftsman Builder's Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194, 1198 (Utah
1999) (noting that the purpose of the open courts clause is to impose a limitation on the
legislature's latitude in defining, modifying, and modernizing the law (citing Berry v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 676 (Utah 1985))). But see Green v. Siegel, Barnett &
Schutz, 557 N.W.2d 396, 402 (S.D. 1996) (recognizing that the open courts provision is
judicial, not legislative in character; '[ilt does not mean that the courts may usurp pow-
ers which belong to the" legislature (quoting Simons v. Kidd, 38 N.W.2d 883, 886 (S.D.
1949))). Some courts have concluded that the open courts provision only confers access to
litigants, not to the general public. See C. v. C., 320 A.2d 717, 728 (Del. 1974); State ex rel.
Post-Tribune Publ'g Co. v. Porter Superior Court, 412 N.E.2d 748, 750-51 (Ind. 1980);
Katz v. Katz, 514 A.2d 1374, 1377 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). However, the greater weight of
authority is that open courts provisions confer upon the general public an independent
right of access to courts. See Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 418 P.2d 594,
597 (Ariz. 1966); KFGO Radio, Inc. v. Rothe, 298 N.W.2d 505, 510-11 (N.D. 1980), limited
by Dickinson Newspapers, Inc. v. Jorgensen, 338 N.W.2d 72, 75-76 (N.D.1983); State ex
rel. The Repository v. Unger, 504 N.E.2d 37, 40 (Ohio 1986); Oregonian Publ'g Co. v.
O'Leary, 736 P.2d 173, 175-76 (Or. 1987); Federated Publ'ns, Inc. v. Kurtz, 615 P.2d 440,
445 (Wash. 1980).
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Several recent developments illustrate this point. Setting aside
the wisdom of limiting access to the federal courts, there have
been numerous examples, both successful and unsuccessful, of
Congress's efforts to trim federal jurisdiction. Successful efforts
include the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996,93 the Prison Litigation Reform Act of
1996,94 and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996.95 Unsuccessful efforts to trim jurisdiction include the
Pornography Jurisdiction Limitation Act of 2006,96 the Consti-
tution Restoration Act of 2005,97 the Marriage Protection Act of
2005,98 the Pledge Protection Act of 2005,99 the Public Prayer
93. Pub. L. No. 104-208 §§ 326, 329, 110 Stat. 3009-631 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1228
(2006)). The Attorney General's discretionary judgment regarding the application of this
section is not subject to review. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (2007). See Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim,
538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003) (concluding that section 1226(e) does not deprive the Court of en-
tertaining a habeas action contesting the validity of the statute, as Congress failed to
make a clear and unequivocal statement removing federal court review in such an action);
see also id. at 535 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (concluding that it cannot seriously be main-
tained that "no court does not really mean 'no court,"' or that Congress was ambiguous in
its intent to deprive federal courts of jurisdiction over the specified decisions of the Attor-
ney General); cf. Exparte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 102 (1868) ("We are not at liberty to
except from [habeas corpus jurisdiction] any cases not plainly excepted by law .... "). But
see INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 326 (2001) ("We find nothing in IJRIRA unmistakably in-
dicating that Congress considered the question whether to apply its repeal of § 212(c) re-
troactively to such aliens. We therefore hold that § 212(c) relief remains available for
aliens, like respondent, whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements and
who, notwithstanding those convictions, would have been eligible for § 212(c) relief at the
time of their plea under the law then in effect.").
94. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C § 1997e
(2000)) (requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a prisoner may file an ac-
tion).
95. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2244
(2000)) (limiting the number of habeas corpus petitions available to prison inmates); see
Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 152 (2007) (holding that a federal district court did not
have jurisdiction to consider a state prisoner's federal habeas corpus petition-which chal-
lenged only the constitutionality of his sentence-because, for purposes of gate keeping
requirements in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), the petition was a "second or successive petition" that
the prisoner had not sought or obtained authorization to file).
96. H.R. 5528, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006) (proposing that no federal court created by Con-
gress should have jurisdiction to decide "whether a State pornography law imposes a con-
stitutionally invalid restriction on the freedom of expression").
97. H.R. 1070, 109th Cong. § 101 (2005) (proposing that the Supreme Court should
"not have jurisdiction to review, by appeal, writ of certiorari, or otherwise, any matter to
the extent that relief is sought against an entity of Federal, State, or local government, or
against an officer or agent [thereof], .. . concerning that entity's, officer's, or agent's ac-
knowledgment of God as the sovereign source of law, liberty, or government").
98. H.R. 1100, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005) (proposing that no federal court or the Supreme
Court should have any jurisdiction to "hear or decide any question pertaining to the inter-
pretation of, or the validity under the Constitution of, section 1738C").
99. H.R. 2389, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005) (proposing that no federal court or the Supreme
Court should have jurisdiction to hear or decide any case pertaining to the constitu-
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Protection Act of 2007,100 the We the People Act,101 and the
Safeguarding Our Religious Liberties Act.102 The point is not to
debate the relative wisdom of such actions, but merely to observe
that Congress, not the Constitution, defines much of what we
know of the federal courts.1 03 Except as to narrow incidents in-
volving the Supreme Court, every exercise of federal judicial pow-
er is co-extensive with the delegated powers of the national gov-
ernment and, as such, is both confined by and dependent upon
tionality of the Pledge of Allegiance).
100. H.R. 2104, 110th Cong. § 3 (2007) (proposing that the Supreme Court should "not
have jurisdiction to review, by appeal, writ of certiorari, or otherwise, any matter that re-
lates to the alleged establishment of religion involving an entity of the federal government
or a State or local government, or an officer or agent [thereof], acting in an official capaci-
ty, concerning the expression of public prayer").
101. H.R. 300, 110th Cong. § 3 (2007) (proposing that no federal court or the Supreme
Court should adjudicate: "(A) any claim involving the laws, regulations, or policies of any
State or unit of local government relating to the free exercise or establishment of religion;
(B) any claim based upon the right of privacy, including any such claim related to any is-
sue of sexual practices, orientation, or reproduction; or (C) any claim based upon equal
protection of the laws to the extent such claim is based upon the right to marry without
regard to sex or sexual orientation"). The proposed Act would have also made it an im-
peachable offense for any justice or judge to violate the Act and would have subjected the
judicial officer to removal by the President under rules adopted by Congress. Id. § 6.
102. H.R. 4576, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005) (proposing that no federal courts or the Su-
preme Court should have jurisdiction "to hear or decide any question pertaining to the in-
terpretation of, or the validity under the Constitution of- (1) the Ten Commandments, or
its recitation, display, acknowledgement, or use; (2) the Pledge of Allegiance . . . or its reci-
tation, display, acknowledgement, or use; and (3) the National Motto . .. or its recitation,
display, acknowledgement, or use"); see also S. 913, 110th Cong. § 1 (2007) (proposing the
amendment of section 221(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(i) § 1),
by providing that a revocation may not be reviewed by any court, and no court shall have
jurisdiction to hear any claim arising from, or any challenge to, such a revocation").
103. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 756, 762-63 (1975) (concluding that 42
U.S.C. § 405(h) deprives the federal courts of general federal question jurisdiction; judicial
review of agency decisions must be grounded in § 405(g)); Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824) ("[W]hen a question to which the judicial power of the
[United States] is extended by the constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause,
it is in the power of Congress to give the Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that cause .... );
Briggs v. Sullivan, 886 F.2d 1132, 1138 (9th Cir. 1989) ("[Flederal courts cannot assume
jurisdiction over controversies concerning the interpretation of the entitlement provisions
of the Social Security Act under the general federal question statute .... "), superseded by
statute, Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled, Pub. L. No. 110-
246, 122 Stat. 1857.
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the extensive legislative powers of Congress.104 This is in sharp
contrast to many states.
Congressional oversight of the federal judiciary extends to the
administration and procedures of the courts. The chief policymak-
ing body for the federal judiciary is the U.S. Judicial Conference,
a statutory creation.105 The Supreme Court possesses no consti-
tutionally based administrative power over the federal judiciary;
its institutional power and influence is largely defined by its po-
litical will. The rulemaking power of the federal judiciary is based
on a statutory grant of authority, not a constitutional delegation
of power.106 As a result, Congress can not only amend federal
court rules but, should it choose, it can also repeal the power to
promulgate rules.107 Thus, Congress's oversight of the federal ju-
diciary is extensive, and includes the creation of inferior courts
and delineation of their jurisdiction, regulation of the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and creation of the administra-
tive and procedural structures under which the federal courts op-
erate.10 8 This extensive legislative regulation of the judiciary is
seldom seen in states. Rather, most state judiciaries enjoy far
greater institutional independence from their respective legisla-
tures, an evolving flashpoint in the debate over the intersection of
state judicial power and legislative policymaking.
104. It is important to recognize constitutional limits when Congress grants original
federal jurisdiction. In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. II, 940 F.2d 832, 876 (3d Cir. 1991)
(Scirica, J., concurring); see Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 304 (1809) (dec-
laring that even within Congress's extensive authority, every grant of federal jurisdiction
must fall within one of the nine categories of cases and controversies enumerated in Ar-
ticle III of the Federal Constitution); see also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47
(1996) (finding that sovereigns that have not consented to jurisdiction cannot be sued);
Jordan v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 16 F.3d 785, 787 (7th Cir. 1994); In re Estate
of Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 501 (9th Cir. 1992).
105. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2000 & Supp. 2006).
106. The Supreme Court of the United States, like many state supreme courts, has the
power to make rules. However, where the rulemaking power of many state supreme courts
is constitutionally conferred, the rulemaking power of the Supreme Court is a statutory
grant under the Rules Enabling Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000); see also Sibbach v. Wil-
son & Co., Inc., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941) (noting Congress's power to regulate the practice
and procedure of federal courts, and its ability to delegate to the federal courts authority
to make rules not inconsistent with the laws or the Federal Constitution).
107. Just as Congress has authority to enact 28 U.S.C. § 2072, it has the authority to
repeal it as well. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (vesting legislative authority in the Congress);
United States v. Mitchell, 317 F. Supp. 166, 170 (D.D.C. 1974).
108. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 9; id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2000 & Supp.
2006).
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B. The Institutional Independence of State Courts
In contrast to federal courts, many state courts enjoy a higher
level of constitutionally rooted structural, institutional, and ju-
risdictional independence. It is important to understand the basis
of this independence. There exist in the United States two gener-
al constitutional frameworks for creating state judiciaries and de-
fining their powers, with a multitude of variations within these
two frameworks. The first framework is similar to the federal
court structure, providing modest and broadly worded judicial ar-
ticles that vest state legislatures with significant authority over
the state judiciary.109 This authority extends to the structure, ju-
risdiction, and administration of the courts. The judicial articles
of Maine, Vermont, and Rhode Island exemplify this approach to
judicial article construction. 110 Each of these state's constitutions
provides for a supreme court, but leaves to the legislature the
creation of inferior courts and the regulation of their jurisdic-
tion.1l1 In some circumstances, judges are appointed by the gov-
ernor, 112 by the governor acting in concert with the state legisla-
ture, 113 or by the legislature itself.114 Rarely are the judges in
such systems elected or retained directly by voters. 115 This first
109. Within this broad generalization there are unique duties imposed upon state judi-
ciaries that one would not find in the federal constitution. See, e.g., IDAHO CONST. art. V, §
25 (mandating that district judges report to the supreme court defects and omissions in
the law which then shall be transmitted by the governor to the legislature); ME. CONST.
art. X, § 6 (mandating that the chief justice shall arrange the constitution into proper ar-
ticles and sections).
110. ME. CONST. art. VI, § 1 ("The judicial power of this State shall be vested in a Su-
preme Judicial Court, and such other courts as the Legislature shall from time to time es-
tablish."); R.I. CONST. art. X, § 2 ("[Ilnferior courts shall have such jurisdiction as may ...
be prescribed by law."); VT. CONST. ch. II, § 31 ("All other courts of this State shall have
original and appellate jurisdiction as provided by law."). It is no accident that the judicial
articles of many of the thirteen original states were similar to Article III of the Federal
Constitution.
111. See ME. CONST. art. VI, § 1; R.I. CONST. art. X, § 2; VT. CONST. ch. II, § 31. Oregon
amended its judicial article to remove constitutional designation of the levels of court in
favor of naming only the supreme court and "such other courts as may from time to time
be created by law." OR. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (amended 1910). The amendment eliminated
constitutional reference to circuit courts, county courts, justices of the peace, and munici-
pal courts. See id.
112. See, e.g., ME. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
113. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. V, § 2; VT. CONST. ch. II, § 32.
114. See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7.
115. See, e.g., OR. CONST. art. VII, §1 ("The judges of the supreme and other courts
shall be elected by the legal voters of the state or of their respective districts for a term of
six years, and shall receive such compensation as may be provided by law, which compen-
sation shall not be diminished during the term for which they are elected.").
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approach to creating a state judiciary is rooted in the eighteenth
century vision of vague judicial powers subject to broad legisla-
tive regulation. 116
The second and far more prevalent constitutional framework
emerged in the mid-1800s with a series of populist reforms-
particularly in the Midwest and the West-that continued into
the twentieth century. 117 It is evidenced by a shift away from the
appointment of judges and toward a system of direct accountabili-
ty through elections.118 The movement was furthered by a wave
of state constitutional reforms in the early and mid-twentieth
century that refined the balance of powers between the branches
of government, increased efficiency by eliminating redundant sys-
tems, and, to a large measure, curtailed unbridled state legisla-
tive power. 119 Changes in state constitutions also impacted judi-
ciaries by shifting from the legislature broad authority regarding
the structure and jurisdiction of the courts and vesting that au-
thority directly in the judiciary. The judicial articles of Arizona,
Missouri, and Utah exemplify this development. 120
With the exception of courts of limited jurisdiction, legislatures
were generally stripped of the ability to expandl21 or to confine122
116. See, e.g., VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. II, § 5 (1793).
117. See generally G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 99-100
(Princeton Univ. Press 1998) (discussing the influence of the Populist movement on nine-
teenth century state constitutions).
118. Compare OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. III, § 8 (1851) (requiring the appointment of
judges to a term of seven years by joint ballot of both houses of the general assembly), with
OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 6 (requiring judges of the supreme court be elected by electors of
the state at large). Compare MO. CONST. of 1820 art. V, § 13 (1945) (requiring that judges
be appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate), with MO. CONST.
art. V, § 19 ("Judges of the supreme court and of the court of appeals shall be selected for
terms of twelve years, judges of the circuit courts for terms of six years, and associate cir-
cuit judges for terms of four years.").
119. See generally Tarr, supra note 117, at 14-15, 38, 141-42 (discussing the separa-
tion of powers in state constitutions, as well as the twentieth century reforms of state con-
stitutions).
120. See ARiz. CONST. art. VI; MO. CONST. art. V; UTAH CONST. art. VIII.
121. See Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Workers' Comp. Procedure, 891 So. 2d 474,
477-78 (Fla. 2004) (holding that the jurisdiction of the courts of Florida is derived entirely
from the constitution and cannot be expanded by the legislature); Neil v. Pub. Utils.
Comm'n, 178 P. 271, 273 (Idaho 1919) (holding that the jurisdiction of this court is fixed by
the state constitution and cannot be extended by the legislature).
122. See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2(B)(3) ("No law shall be passed or rule made
whereby any person shall be prevented from invoking the original jurisdiction of the su-
preme court."); State ex rel. Neely v. Brown, 864 P.2d 1038, 1041 (Ariz. 1993) (Martone, J.,
concurring) ("[W]hen the constitution grants original jurisdiction to a court, the legislature
cannot take it away."); Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 818 S.W.2d 935,
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the jurisdiction of the courts. 123 The particular structure of the
courts was specified in the constitution, in several cases by col-
lapsing various levels of trial courts into one court of general ju-
risdiction and by limiting the legislature's involvement in struc-
tural issues to courts of limited jurisdiction.124 The authority to
administer the courts was vested in the state supreme court125 or
937 (Ark. 1991) (stating that pursuant to "Amendment 58 to the [state] constitution,
which created the court of appeals, and Rule 29 of the Rules of the Arkansas Supreme
Court, [the supreme court] decide[s] the appellate jurisdiction of the court of appeals, not
the legislature"); Leone v. Med. Bd., 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 689, 694 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (stating
that the legislature may not take away jurisdiction "constitutionally granted"), overruled
by Leone v. Med. Bd., 995 P.2d 191, 196-98 (Cal. 2000) (holding that, in this particular
case, the act of the legislature did not violated the state constitution); Garcia v. Dist.
Court, 403 P.2d 215, 219 (Colo. 1965) (holding the legislature's attempt to reduce constitu-
tional jurisdiction of district courts void); State v. Jefferson, 758 So.2d 661, 664 (Fla. 2000)
(noting the constitution does not give the legislature the authority to restrict the subject
matter jurisdiction of the appellate courts to hear criminal appeals), overruled by Leonard
v. State, 760 So.2d 114, 118 (Fla. 2000) (reading the statute to codify existing limitations
rather than to limit the court's subject matter jurisdiction); Pope v. State, 792 So.2d 713,
720 (La. 2001) (holding that the legislature cannot "divest the district courts of the origi-
nal jurisdiction fixed by the constitution"); State v. Losh, 721 N.W.2d 886, 892 (Minn.
2006) (interpreting the constitution to grant the supreme court independent authority to
review determinations by the other state courts because such authority is granted by the
state constitution and the "legislature cannot 'prohibit or require this court to exercise its
appellate jurisdiction"' (quoting State v. Wingo, 266 N.W.2d 508, 512 (Minn. 1978))).
123. Many state constitutional reforms of the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies-the so-called Progressive Era-were directed at curbing the abuse of state legisla-
tive powers. See Rachel M. Janutis, The Struggle Over Tort Reform and the Overlooked
Legacy of the Progressives, 39 AKRON L. REV. 943, 956-58 (2006).
124. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("The judicial power of the State is vested in
a supreme court, a superior court, and the courts established by the legislature."); CAL.
CONST. art. VI, § 1 ("The judicial power of this State is vested in the Supreme Court,
courts of appeal, and superior courts, all of which are courts of record."); HAW. CONST. art.
VI, § 1 ("The judicial power of the State shall be vested in one supreme court, one inter-
mediate appellate court, circuit courts, district courts and in such other courts as the legis-
lature may from time to time establish."); KY. CONST. § 109 ("The judicial power of the
Commonwealth shall be vested exclusively in one Court of Justice which shall be divided
into a Supreme Court, a Court of Appeals, a trial court of general jurisdiction known as
the Circuit Court and a trial court of limited jurisdiction known as the District Court. The
court shall constitute a unified judicial system for operation and administration."); MINN.
CONST. art. VI, § 3 ("The district court has original jurisdiction in all civil and criminal
cases and shall have appellate jurisdiction as prescribed by law."); MONT. CONST. art. VII,
§ 1 ("The judicial power of the state is vested in one supreme court, district courts, justice
courts, and such other courts as may be provided by law."); N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 7a ('The
supreme court shall have general original jurisdiction in law and equity and the appellate
jurisdiction herein provided."); WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The supreme court shall have
original jurisdiction in habeas corpus, and quo warranto and mandamus as to all state of-
ficers, and appellate jurisdiction in all actions and proceedings, excepting that its appel-
late jurisdiction shall not extend to civil actions at law for the recovery of money or per-
sonal property when the original amount in controversy, or the value of the property does
not exceed the sum of two hundred dollars ($200) unless the action involves the legality of
a tax, impost, assessment, tool, municipal fine, or the validity of a statute.").
125. See, e.g., KY. CONST. § 110(5)(b); MO. CONST. art. V, § 4; MONT. CONST. art. VII, §
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a state judicial council.126 The power to adopt procedural rules
was constitutionally delegated to the state judiciary,127 with the
legislature generally playing a limited oversight role.128 And in
several states, the constitution, in addition to defining the appel-
late and original jurisdiction of their supreme courts, also granted
the court the power to provide advisory opinions to the legisla-
ture, the executive, or both.129 In short, the state legislature's
judicial oversight authority was significantly curtailed, and many
aspects of judicial operations and jurisdiction placed beyond its
reach.130
2; WIS. CONST. art. VII § 4(3).
126. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
127. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 5.5; COLO. CONST. art. VI § 21; D.C. CONST. art.
VI, § 15; MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 5; MO. CONST. art. V, § 5.
128. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 15 (stating that rules may be changed upon
two-thirds vote of each house); FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a) (stating that the supreme court
shall promulgate uniform court rules with the advice and consent of the council). But see
D.C. CONST. art. IV, § 5 ("These rules may be changed by law."). Some state constitutions
provide that court rules related to practice and procedure have the force and effect of law,
superseding laws to the contrary. See Stern Bros., Inc. v. McClure, 236 S.E.2d 222, 227
(W. Va. 1977) ("The administrative rules promulgated by this Court... operate to super-
sede the existing statutory provisions ...."); State ex rel. Union Elec. Co. v. Barnes, 893
S.W.2d 804, 805 (Mo. 1995) ("[I1f there is a conflict between this Court's rules and a sta-
tute, the rule always prevails if it addresses practice, procedure or pleadings." (citing Rei-
chert v. Lynch, 651 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Mo. 1983))); see also MD. CONST. art. IV, § 18; HAW.
CONST. art. VI, § 7; N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 73-a; Bright v. Dicke, 652 N.E.2d 275, 277-78
(Ill. 1995) (holding that supreme court rules are neither aspirational nor mere suggestions;
they have the force and effect of law).
129. Eight states permit or require the supreme court to give advisory opinions to the
governor, the legislature, or other elected officials: Colorado, Florida, Maine, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and South Dakota. See Mel A. Topf, The
Jurisprudence of the Advisory Opinion Process in Rhode Island, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 207, 254-56 (1997). Two states provide for supreme court advisory opinions by
statute: Alabama and Delaware. Id. at 254. In Maine, for example, "[t]he Justices of the
Supreme Judicial Court shall be obliged to give their opinion upon important questions of
law, and upon solemn occasions, when required by the Governor, Senate or House of Rep-
resentatives." ME. CONST. art. VI, § 3. The Florida Supreme Court, however, may issue
advisory opinions in only two instances: (1) to the governor concerning the exercise of ex-
ecutive power, and (2) to the attorney general on matters concerning citizen initiatives to
amend the constitution. FLA. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1(c), 10.
130. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art V, § 1 ('The judicial power shall be vested in a supreme
court, district courts of appeal, circuit courts and county courts. No other courts may be
established by the state, any political subdivision or any municipality."); IDAHO CONST.
art. V, § 13 ("The legislature shall have no power to deprive the judicial department of any
power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it as a coordinate department of the gov-
ernment .... "); N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("The General Assembly shall have no power to
deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction that rightfully pertains to it
as a co-ordinate department of the government, nor shall it establish or authorize any
courts other than as permitted by this Article.").
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The combined effect of this almost century-long reform was the
creation of robust state judiciaries with greater structural and ju-
risdictional autonomy, and judicial officers directly accountable to
the public through an election processl 3l or through the appoint-
ment-retention process first established in Missouri.13 2 Institu-
tional autonomy increased correspondingly as judicial officers be-
came more directly accountable to the public, who could remove
them for any or no reason. 133 This connection between a state's
judicial power and its people-power that is not contingent on the
legislature's exercise of its authority-can produce state judicial
systems that are able to play a more active role in state affairs
due to their greater institutional independence from legislative
regulation. One of the great misapprehensions in the current de-
bate on judicial power is the tendency in some quarters to de-
mand greater legislative oversight of state judiciaries under a
broad claim of increasing democratic accountability, all the while
ignoring the element of direct popular accountability that cur-
rently exists in most states.
IV. CHECKS AND BALANCES AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS
A. Challenge of Judicial Deference toState Legislative
Policymaking
The relationship between state judicial power and legislative
policymaking is defined by the particular elements of each state's
constitution. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, most state constitu-
tions are anything but models of brevity;134 they are evolving
documents amended on a nearly constant basis. 135 This process of
131. See S.C. CONST. art. V, § 3; WIS. CONST. art. VII, §§ 4, 7. South Carolina is unique
in that its judicial structure is a hybrid, combining structural and jurisdictional indepen-
dence with a system of judicial selection vested exclusively in the state legislature. See
S.C. CONST. art. V, § 3.
132. See, e.g., MO. CONST. art. V, § 25. For a summary of judicial selection methods, see
AM. JUDICATURE SOC., JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES: APPELLATE AND GENERAL
JURISDICTION COURTS (2007), http://www.ajs.org/selection/docs/udicial%20Selction%
Charts.pdf [hereinafter JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES].
133. The development of state judicial disciplinary commissions which are independent
arms of the judiciary charged with monitoring and enforcing ethical standards, also helped
create robust judiciaries. See, e.g., NEV. CONST. art. VI, § 21; PA. CONST. art. V, § 18.
134. The Alabama Constitution, for example, is approximately 129,000 words and has
been amended some 383 times. See Albert L. Sturm, The Development of American State
Constitutions, 12 PUBLIUS 57, 75 tbl. 3 (1982).
135. Missouri has had four constitutions since statehood in 1820. See Sturm, supra
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constant change has enabled states to add definition and clarity
by articulating with greater precision the power and structure of
their governing systems, including their judiciaries. This constant
process of change has also at times led to unwise limits on state
power,1 36 reduced the flexibility of states to adapt to changing
circumstances,1 37 and injected an almost hyper-democratic atti-
tude towards governing that allows virtually any idea to have air
time, no matter how meritorious or how outlandish.138 The sheer
magnitude of a state's constitution influences the breadth or lim-
its of judicial power. The more refined and encompassing a state's
constitution, the greater likelihood the courts will be called upon
to play an active role in interpreting and enforcing the myriad
constitutional limits on power, particularly legislative power. The
more general and undefined a state's constitution, the greater
likelihood the courts will defer to broad claims of state legislative
prerogative. 139
note 134, at 59. Kentucky has operated under four constitutions since statehood in 1792.
See id. Alabama operates under the 1901 constitution, which is its sixth constitution. See
id. By contrast, the oldest operational state constitution belongs to Massachusetts, which
took effect in 1780. See id. In addition to rewriting a state constitution, many states pro-
vide for either a direct or indirect initiative petition process that enables citizens to pro-
pose constitutional changes outside the legislative process. See id. at 76, 80; National Con-
ference of State Legislators, Initiative, Referendum and Recall, http://www.ncsl.org/
programs/legismgt/elect/initiat.htm (last visited Dec. 11, 2008). States having such a
process include Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota,
Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. National Conference of State Legislators, Initiative, Re-
ferendum and Recall, http://www.ncsl.org/programsflegismgt/elect/irstates.htm (last vi-
sited Dec. 11, 2008).
136. See, e.g., MO. CONST. art. X, §18(e)(1). This provision limits the amount of taxes
the General Assembly can raise in any one fiscal year to a formulaic amount. See id. Any
increases over and above that amount must be approved by the voters of the state. See id.
Arguably, this severely reduces the ability of the legislature to increase revenues to meet
new program needs and mandates, and to weather economically difficult times.
137. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20. This provision created the Taxpayer's Bill of
Rights ("TABOR"), which placed limits on the growth of state government. See id. § 20(1).
In 2005, at the urging of the governor, voters suspended TABOR to enable the state to ad-
dress its growing budget problems. See Jessica Fender, Election Hard Time To Tinker with
TABOR, DENVER POST, May 13, 2008, http://www.denverpost.com/search/ci-9238326 (not-
ing voter's success in suspending TABOR in 2005).
138. See, e.g., Chet Brokaw, A Movement Is Under Way in S.D. To Strip Judges of Their
Immunity Against Lawsuits, A.P. WIRE, Nov. 14, 2005. The so-called "JAIL Initiative"
sought to amend South Dakota's constitution by providing an elaborate system in which
parties aggrieved by a judicial decision could file a complaint with a special grand jury
empowered to strip judges of immunity from civil suits. See id. The proposal would also
enable the special grand jury to indict a judge on criminal charges, impose fines and re-
move the judge from office. See id.
139. See, e.g., Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 44-45 (R.I. 1995) ("Because of the
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In order to understand the intersection of state judicial and leg-
islative power, one must begin with this generally accepted prop-
osition: because state constitutions are "certificates" of limitation
as opposed to "grants" of authority, state legislatures enjoy ple-
nary power limited only by the expressed provisions of each
state's constitution.140 "Any constitutional limitation, therefore,
must be strictly construed in favor of the power of the General
Assembly."141 Consequently, state courts generally defer to the
legislature in the substantive exercise of legislative power be-
cause what is not specifically limited is assumed granted.142 This
is a starkly different context for containing the exercise of gov-
ernment power than that faced by the federal courts, where pow-
er is defined by delegation.
However, there are underlying and seemingly conflicting rela-
tional issues between the exercise of legislative and judicial pow-
er at the state level-issues that center on balancing presump-
tively plenary legislative power with particularized substantive
and procedural limitations on that power. The general principle
of state judicial deference to legislative authority must be
nuanced in particular circumstances by considerations for the
very principle of constitutional limitation. Accordingly, judicial
deference to state legislative power is in constant competition and
conflict with specific commands in a state's constitution that im-
pose significant and, at times, very clear limitations on the exer-
cise of that power. Too much deference to state legislative power
renders constitutional limitations meaningless, in effect tipping
the system of checks and balances in the direction of unbridled
legislative authority. Too little deference to state legislative pow-
er erodes its presumptively plenary nature and creates ample
grounds for political and interbranch conflict over the parameters
of particular limitations.
broad plenary power of the General Assembly, this court's evaluation of legislative enact-
ments has been extremely deferential .... Specifically, this court will not invalidate a leg-
islative enactment unless the party challenging the enactment can prove beyond a reason-
able doubt to this court that the statute in question is repugnant to a provision in the
constitution." (citing Gorham v. Robinson, 186 A. 832, 837 (R.I. 1936))).
140. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. City of St. Louis, 879 S.W.2d 530, 532-33 (Mo. 1994).
141. Id. at 533 (citing Brown v. Morris, 290 S.W.2d 160, 166 (Mo. 1956)).
142. For a general discussion on federal court deference to Congress, see Robert A.
Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and Federal Constitu-
tional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656 (2000).
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How much deference to pay a state legislature in particular cir-
cumstances implicates the differing policy functions of the judi-
ciary and legislature and informs the breadth of the judiciary's
role in state policy matters. Because every state legislative act is
effectively a policy action framed by the principle of plenary pow-
er, judicial invalidation of an act is a policy action framed primar-
ily by the principle of constitutional limitation. Therefore, the de-
gree of deference to be afforded state legislatures is informed by
broad constitutional tenets, and specific constitutional limitations
intended to embrace a broad array of policy matters and the very
process by which a state legislature makes policy choices.143 Op-
ponents of robust state judicial review frequently overlook or dis-
regard this important nuance-that is, the nuance of limitation.
Nowhere in the Federal Constitution do the principles of plenary
legislative authority collide with stringent constitutional limita-
tion in such an explicit fashion. Arguably, some state courts have
been far too deferential and dormant in reviewing the exercise of
state legislative powers, even in the face of specific constitutional
limitations.144
B. Judicial Review of the Substance and Procedure of Legislative
Policymaking
Unlike the power under the Federal Constitution, the power of
judicial review at the state level is both explicit and implied.
Many state constitutions recognize the power of judicial review
by: (1) placing restrictions on its exercise;14 5 (2) specifically re-
143. See, e.g., MO. CONST. art. III, § 39(d) ("All state revenues derived from the conduct
of all gaming activities as are now or hereafter authorized by this constitution or by law,
unless otherwise provided by law on the effective date of this section, shall be appro-
priated beginning July 1, 1993, solely for the public institutions of elementary, secondary
and higher education and shall not be included within the definition of 'total state reve-
nues' in section 17 of article X of this constitution.").
144. Many state constitutions contain a "single subject" limitation on legislative acts.
See, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. II, § 19 ("No bill shall embrace more than one subject, and
that shall be expressed in the title."). One method state legislatures employ to avoid this
limitation is the adoption of "omnibus bills." See, e.g., In re Boot, 925 P.2d 964, 972 (Wash.
1996) (stating that the omnibus bill is intended to solve one problem in a "comprehensive
manner"). Courts generally uphold such measures even in the face of strict constitutional
prohibitions. See id. at 971 (requiring "rational unity" between the subjects contained in
an omnibus bill).
145. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("[T]he [supreme] court shall not declare any law
unconstitutional except when sitting in banc."); UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 2 ("The [su-
preme] court shall not declare any law unconstitutional under this constitution or the
Constitution of the United States, except on the concurrence of a majority of all justices of
[Vol. 43:571
2009] STATE JUDICIAL POWER AND LEGISLATIVE POLICYMAKING 605
cognizing and authorizing judicial review;146 and (3) creating li-
mitations on the exercise of state power, particularly legislative
power, enforceable by the judiciary.147 In this latter context, con-
stitutional limitations are both substantive and procedural in na-
ture; they not only limit the subject matters on which a state leg-
islature may act, but also stipulate by prescription or prohibition
the procedures a legislature must employ when it acts.
Substantive limitations on the lawmaking, i.e., policymaking,
authority of a state legislature can include provisions prohibiting
special legislationl48 and limiting legislative topics. 149 Procedural
limitations include defining the bill format,150 the number of
times a bill must be read,151 the procedure by which a bill is
adopted,15 2 and imposing a "single subject" requirement on pro-
the Supreme Court.").
146. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. VI, § 6, para. 2(1) (stating that the supreme court shall
have jurisdiction in "[a]ll cases involving the construction of a treaty or of the Constitution
of the State of Georgia or of the United States and all cases in which the constitutionality
of a law, ordinance, or constitutional provision has been drawn into question."); see also
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3); LA. CONST. art. V, § 5(D); Mo. CONST. art. V, § 3; OHIO
CONST. art. IV, § 2(B).
147. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20(1) ("Individual or class action enforcement
suits may be filed and shall have the highest civil priority of resolution."); MO. CONST. art.
X, § 18(e)(5) ("Any taxpayer or statewide elected official may bring an action under the
provisions of section 23 of this article to enforce compliance with the provisions of this sec-
tion. The Missouri supreme court shall have original jurisdiction to hear any challenge
brought by any statewide elected official to enforce this section.").
148. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 104 (containing thirty-one subject matter limita-
tions on the legislature's lawmaking powers); ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, § 19 (containing twenty
subject matter limitations on the legislature's lawmaking powers).
149. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. XVIII, § 6 ("The right of action to recover damages for
injuries shall never be abrogated, and the amount recovered shall not be subject to any
statutory limitation."); KY. CONST. § 54 ("The General Assembly shall have no power to
limit the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to persons
or property.").
150. See, e.g., MO. CONST. art. III, § 21 ("The style of the laws of this state shall be: 'Be
it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as follows.' No law shall be
passed except by bill, and no bill shall be so amended in its passage through either house
as to change its original purpose.").
151. See, e.g., W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 29 ("No bill shall become a law, until it has been
fully and distinctly read, on three different days, in each house, unless, in case of urgency,
by a vote of four fifths of the members present, taken by yeas and nays on each bill, this
rule be dispensed with: Provided, in all cases, that an engrossed bill shall be fully and dis-
tinctly read in each house.").
152. See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. IV, § 11 ("No bill shall become a law unless, prior to its
passage: (a) it has been referred to a committee of each house, considered by such commit-
tee in session, and reported; (b) it has been printed by the house in which it originated
prior to its passage therein; (c) it has been read by its title, or its title has been printed in
a daily calendar, on three different calendar days in each house; and (d) upon its final pas-
sage a vote has been taken thereon in each house, the name of each member voting for and
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posed bills.153 Whether substantive or procedural in nature, such
constitutional measures constrain the otherwise presumptive
plenary power of state legislatures.154 The remainder of this ar-
ticle discusses several of these substantive and procedural limita-
tions as examples of significant constraints that state voters have
placed on the exercise of legislative power, and hence, legislative
policymaking. These limitations frequently implicate judicial
power and legislative prerogative, judicial deference and constitu-
tional limitations, and, of course, the politics of policymaking.
1. Limits on the Legislature's Appropriation Power
The power to appropriate public funds is the ultimate public
policy power. Over time, therefore, voters in many states have
imposed a series of constitutional limitations and priorities on the
process,J55 effectively constraining not only the legislature's ap-
propriation power, but also indirectly, its lawmaking power.156 It
is the nature of state legislatures to push the boundaries of their
powers, and nowhere is this clearer than in the appropriations
arena. State constitutions, therefore, frequently define with some
specificity the manner in which state money is to be appropriated
and spent. 157 Constitutional restrictions in the appropriations
arena run the gamut from limiting the subjects for appropria-
tions, to the priority to be given various appropriations, to the
content of an appropriations bill.158 In comparison, no such con-
stitutional limitation is imposed on Congress. States may also re-
against recorded in the journal, and a majority of those voting in each house, which major-
ity shall include at least two-fifths of the members elected to that house, recorded in the
affirmative.").
153. See discussion infra, Part IV.B.3.
154. See Mecham v. Gordon, 751 P.2d 957, 962 (Ariz. 1988) (finding that the court has
the constitutional power to ensure that the legislature follows the rules governing im-
peachments).
155. See, e.g., MO. CONST. art. III, § 36 (delineating the order in which state funds
should be distributed to various programs and for various purposes); W. VA. CONST. art.
VI, § 51 ('The legislature shall not appropriate any money out of the treasury except in
accordance with provisions of this section.").
156. See Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen. re Requirement for Adequate Pub.
Educ. Funding, 703 So.2d 446, 449 (Fla. 1997); State ex rel. Bd. of Educ. v. Caperton, 441
S.E.2d 373, 375-76 (W. Va. 1994).
157. See, e.g., MD. CONST. art. III, § 52 ("The General Assembly shall not appropriate
any money out of the Treasury except in accordance with the provisions of this section.").
158. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, § 20 (setting limitations on the subject matter of
appropriations bills); Mo. CONST. art. III, § 36 (specifying the priority that should be given
to various appropriations).
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strict the purposes for which state funds can be spent, placing
limits on the entities or individuals who can receive state
funds.159 Notwithstanding these limitations, with few exceptions,
state courts have tended to shy away from a direct conflict with
the legislature over its appropriation authority.160 To intervene
in the budget process generally has been seen as tantamount to
political suicide, with the possible exception of funding for public
education. 161 Litigation involving this matter is not based on spe-
cific constitutional limits placed on the legislature's appropriation
authority, but rather on affirmative commands that a state pro-
vide an appropriate free education,162 or on a state's violations of
equal protection. 163
There are four principal provisions found in state constitutions
that limit the spending powers of state legislatures. First, many
states are required to maintain a balanced budget.164 Forty-three
159. See, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. VII, § 4 ("No tax shall be levied or appropriation of
public money or property made, nor shall the public credit be used, directly or indi-
rectly, except for a public purpose. No grant shall be made in violation of Section 4 of
Article I of this constitution. No grant of public money or property shall be made ex-
cept pursuant to standards provided by law."); Mo. CONST. art. I, § 7 ("That no money
shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church,
sect or denomination of religion, or in aid of any priest, preacher, minister or teacher the-
reof, as such; and that no preference shall be given to nor any discrimination made against
any church, sect or creed of religion, or any form of religious faith or worship."); VA.
CONST. art. IV, § 16 ("The General Assembly shall not make any appropriation of public
funds, personal property, or real estate to any church or sectarian society...)."
160. See, e.g., Pataki v. N.Y. State Assembly, 774 N.Y.S.2d 891, 894 (N.Y. App. Div.
2004) (finding that the court should not "immerse" itself in the political process of formu-
lating the state budget; "defendants' proper constitutional action was to refuse to pass
plaintiffs appropriation bills and induce negotiations").
161. See, e.g., Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1360 (N.H. 1997) (hold-
ing the then-current system of financing elementary and secondary public education was
unconstitutional); McDuffy v. Sec'y of Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 519
(Mass. 1993) (holding that the state constitution imposes an affirmative duty on the
Commonwealth to provide adequate public education); DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733,
745 (Ohio 1997) (finding that certain provisions of the elementary and secondary school
financing system violated the Ohio constitution).
162. See, e.g., Montoy v. State, 112 P.3d 923, 939-40 (Kan. 2005) (directing the legisla-
ture to increase annual school funding to $285 million, and rejecting the state's additional
appropriation of $142 million as inadequate because there was no study or other evidence
to support it).
163. See, e.g., Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 397 (Vt. 1997) (holding that the present
system of financing public schools had fallen short of providing every school-age child an
equal educational opportunity).
164. See Ronald K. Snell, State Balanced Budget Requirements: Provisions and Prac-
tice (2004), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/fiscalfbalbuda.htm. One result of these provi-
sions is that states have increasingly relied on federal funding to support state-based pro-
grams. The combined effect of balanced budget requirements and low-tax demands of
citizens has made states heavily reliant on deficit-allowed federal spending. This reliance
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states require the governor to present a balanced budget to the
legislature.1 65 Forty states require the legislature to adopt a ba-
lanced budget.16 6 Thirty-eight states prohibit the carrying of a
deficit from one fiscal cycle to the next. 167 These restrictions rare-
ly, if ever, give rise to judicial intervention. When state courts
confront balanced budget disputes, they exclusively defer to state
legislatures and executives to decide the priorities and realloca-
tion of money. 168
Second, many state constitutions impose constitutional restric-
tions regarding the manner in which the legislature constructs its
spending bills.169 These restrictions are frequently expressed in
the principle that a legislature cannot legislate through appropri-
ations and the principle that appropriations must be made for a
has skewed the "true cost of ownership of state government" by shifting a significant por-
tion of financing state operations to the federal budget. For example, Ohio's biennium
budget for 2008-2009 has 21.6% of estimated revenues coming from federal funds. See
OFFICE OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, STATE OF OHIO EXECUTIVE BUDGET FOR FISCAL
YEARS 2008 AND 2009, C-3 (2009), available at http://www.obm.ohio.gov/budget/operating/
executive/0809bb0809_c.pdf. Some 37% of North Dakota's 2007-2009 biennium budget
comes from federal funds. STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA, LEGISLATIVE APPROPRIATIONS 2007-
2009 BIENNIUM 15 (2009), available at http://www.nd.gov/fiscal/docs/budget/appropbook
2007-09.pdf. This means of financing has given the federal government a much larger role
to play in defining and controlling the domestic agendas of the states under its spending
powers. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (upholding Congress's authori-
ty to indirectly regulate state drinking ages through spending power, stating that "Con-
gress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds and has repeatedly employed
the power 'to further broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon
compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and administrative directive"' (quoting
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980))); see also United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936) (finding that under the spending clause "the power of Congress to au-
thorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by direct grants of
legislative power found in the Constitution," and objectives not thought to be within Ar-
ticle I's enumerated legislative powers may nevertheless be attained through the use of
the spending power and the conditional grant of federal funds).
165. See Snell, supra note 164.
166. Id.
167. Id.; cf. Employers Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Exam'rs, 21 P.3d 628, 634 (Nev. 2001)
(finding that the state is liable under the terms of the lease only for payments for which
the legislature made appropriations, and that if the legislature fails to appropriate money
for lease payments in subsequent years, the state has no liability).
168. See, e.g., Judy v. Schaefer, 627 A.2d 1039, 1049 (Md. 1993) (holding that the gov-
ernor's power to reduce appropriations under Maryland Code section 7-213 is consistent
with the power of the governor in the budgetary process and is necessary to carry out the
balanced budget requirement of the constitution); Bd. of Educ. v. Kean, 457 A.2d 59, 63
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982) (holding that the constitution requires a balanced budget
and that when expenditure cuts are required to achieve a balanced budget, the responsi-
bility belongs to the legislature and the governor).
169. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. V, § 32; LA. CONST. art. III, § 16(C); PA. CONST. art. III,
§ 11; WASH. CONST. art. II, § 19.
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specific, not general or undefined, purpose. 170 Such constitutional
limitations have given rise to a number of cases requiring state
courts to confront a range of attempts to legislate through appro-
priations. 171 Due to the explicit nature of these restrictions, state
courts have been less deferential to legislative attempts to meld
the appropriations process with substantive acts of lawmaking.172
170. See, e.g. KAN. CONST. art. II, § 24 ("No money shall be drawn from the treasury
except in pursuance of a specific appropriation made by law.").
171. See infra note 172.
172. See Alaska Legis. Council v. Knowles, 21 P.3d 367, 377 (Alaska 2001) ("[T]o satisfy
the confinement clause, the qualifying language [in a bill] must be the minimum necessary
to explain the Legislature's intent regarding how the money appropriated is to be spent. It
must not administer the program of expenditures. It must not enact law or amend existing
law. It must not extend beyond the life of the appropriation. Finally, the language must be
germane, that is appropriate, to an appropriations bill." (citation omitted)); Colo. Gen. As-
sembly v. Owens, 136 P.3d 262, 266 (Colo. 2006) ("A general appropriations bill may only
contain appropriations for the expenses of the executive, legislative, and judicial depart-
ments of the state, state institutions, interest on the public debt, and public schools. The
legislature is prohibited from including substantive legislation in a general appropriations
bill." (citations omitted)); Turnbull v. Fink, 668 A.2d 1370, 1383 (Del. 1995) ("If an appro-
priation act contains substantive, non-financial legislation, it then becomes precisely the
kind of omnibus bill the single-subject and title rules were meant to prohibit."); Thompson
v. Graham, 481 So. 2d 1212, 1214 (Fla. 1985) ("The term 'appropriation' act obviously
would not include an act of general legislation; and a bill proposing such an act is not con-
verted into an appropriation bill simply because it has engrafted upon it a section making
an appropriation. An appropriation bill is one the primary and specific aim of which is to
make appropriations of money from the public treasury." (quoting Bergzon v. Sec'y of Jus-
tice, 299 U.S. 410, 413 (1937))); Henry v. Edwards, 346 So. 2d 153, 156-57 (La. 1977) ("[A]
general appropriation bill [is] a particular type of legislation which is specifically ad-
dressed in La. Const. art. 3, § 16(c) and which differs in nature and scope from other legis-
lative pronouncements .... 'The general appropriation bill shall be itemized and shall con-
tain only appropriations for the ordinary expenses of government, public charities,
pensions, and the public debt or interest thereon."' (quoting LA. CONST. art. III, § 16(c)));
Opponents of Prison Site, Inc. v. Carnahan, 994 S.W.2d 573, 580 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999)
("[A]n appropriation bill is limited to appropriating state funds .... [A] general appropria-
tion bill, containing appropriation for numerous unrelated state activities, cannot amend
substantive legislation .... " (citing Rolla 31 Sch. Dist. v. State, 837 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Mo.
1992))); Hosp. & Healthsystem Ass'n v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 828 A.2d 1196, 1201 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2003) (stating that the constitution mandates that "'a general appropriation
bill shall embrace nothing but appropriations for the executive, legislative and judicial de-
partments of the Commonwealth, for the public debt and for public schools"' (citing PA.
CONST. art. III, § 11)), rev'd and remanded by Hosp. & Healthsystem Ass'n v. Dep't of Pub.
Welfare, 888 A.2d 601 (Pa. 2005); S.D. Educ. Ass'n v. Barnett, 582 N.W.2d 386, 391-92
(S.D. 1998) (holding that a section of an appropriations bill effecting a substantive change
in law violated the constitution); Retired Pub. Employees Council v. Charles, 62 P.3d 470,
485 (Wash. 2003) (prohibiting appropriations bills from defining rights or altering existing
laws (citing Serv. Employees Int'l Union Local 6 v. Superintendent of Pub. Instruction,
705 P.2d 776, 781 (Wash. 1985))); Common Cause v. Tomblin, 413 S.E.2d 358, 401 (W. Va.
1991) (Miller, C.J., dissenting) ("We have rejected the notion that the legislature can
amend or abolish specific statutes through the budget.").
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Third, state constitutions can impose on a legislature limits
concerning the purposes to which appropriations can be commit-
ted. Such restrictions are expressed as "public purpose" limita-
tions, which are intended to prevent state legislatures from di-
verting public money to private purposes.1 73 What constitutes a
"public purpose" can be a source of controversy, and has been the
subject of significant litigation.'74 Generally, an appropriation
must "confer[ I a direct public benefit of a reasonably general cha-
racter... to a significant part of the public, as distinguished from
a remote and theoretical benefit."175 The appropriation must im-
plicate state police powers and have for its objective the promo-
tion of public health, safety, morals, security, prosperity, con-
tentment, and the general welfare of the community.1 76 In most
cases, courts have viewed the legislatures' determinations of
"public purpose" broadly,177 sustaining a wide range of expendi-
173. See, e.g., MONT. CONST. art V, § 11(5) ("No appropriation shall be made for reli-
gious, charitable, industrial, educational, or benevolent purposes to any private individual,
private association, or private corporation not under control of the state."). Additional pub-
lic purpose limitations are expressed in terms of limiting support for religious institutions.
See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. III, § 29 ("No appropriation shall be made for charitable, educa-
tional or benevolent purposes to any person or community nor to any denominational and
sectarian institution, corporation or association ...."). Some courts have implied a "public
purpose" limitation on the theory that taxes are an involuntary means for funding gov-
ernment operations and corresponding expenditures are limited to the underlying purpose
of taxation. See, e.g., Ennis v. State Highway Comm'n, 108 N.E.2d 687, 697 (Ind. 1952)
("It is implied in all definitions of taxation that taxes can be levied for public purpose on-
ly."' (quoting State ex. rel. Jackson v. Middleton, 19 N.E.2d 470, 475 (Ind. 1939))).
174. See, e.g., Dale F. Rubin, Public Aid to Professional Sports Teams-A Constitution-
al Disgrace: The Battle To Revive Judicial Rulings and State Constitutional Enactments
Prohibiting Public Subsidies to Private Corporations, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 393, 402-08
(1999) (discussing the controversy over giving public money to professional sports teams
and the rationale for prohibiting public aid to private corporations). Outside of the general
"public purpose" requirement, state legislatures are also subject to very specific restric-
tions on the use of state revenues. See, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. II, § 40 (providing that
state highway tax revenue must be deposited into a special fund and used only for the
maintenance of the state's roads).
175. Opinion of the Justices, 150 N.E.2d 693, 697 (Mass. 1958).
176. Platte Valley Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist. v. Lincoln County, 14 N.W.2d 202, 205
(Neb. 1944); State ex rel. McClure v. Hagerman, 98 N.E.2d 835, 838 (Ohio 1951); Blumen-
thal v. City of Cheyenne, 186 P.2d 556, 561-62 (Wyo. 1947) (quoting Fritz v. Presbrey, 116
A. 419, 421 (R.I. 1922)).
177. See Cal. Ass'n of Retail Tobacconists v. State, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 224, 243 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2003) (holding that a restriction on expenditures of public money for public purposes
must be read broadly and does not prohibit the legislature from appropriating money to
private efforts that serve a public benefit (citing JOSEPH R. GRODIN ET AL., THE
CALIFORNIA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 280-81 (1993))); R.E. Short Co. v.
City of Minneapolis, 269 N.W.2d 331, 337 (Minn. 1978) (finding that "great deference" is to
be paid to a legislative determination that expenditures serve a public purpose); State ex
rel. Zillmer v. Kreutzberg, 90 N.W. 1098, 1105 (Wis. 1902) ("[I]f a public purpose can be
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tures, including money for private development.1 78 However, in a
number of cases, courts have also struck down legislative at-
tempts to divert public money to seemingly private ventures. 179
As the Supreme Court of North Carolina has observed,
The General Assembly has declared in the Act that the financing and
construction of hospital facilities is a public purpose for which public
money may be expended and that the enactment of this Act is neces-
sary and proper for effectuating the purposes therein set forth. Such
an expression of opinion by the General Assembly is entitled to, and is
always given, great weight by this Court, but it is not conclusive. It is
the duty and prerogative of this Court to determine whether an ap-
propriation of tax funds is for a purpose forbidden by the Constitu-
tion of the State when, as here, that question is properly raised.180
Finally, a state constitution can impose limits on the legisla-
ture's ability to pledge a state's credit for purposes unrelated to
public needs.181 For example, Article II, section 31 of the Tennes-
see Constitution provides,
The credit of this State shall not be hereafter loaned or given to or in
aid of any person, association, company, corporation or municipality:
nor shall the State become the owner in whole or in part of any bank
or a stockholder with others in any association, company, corporation
or municipality. 182
conceived which might rationally be deemed to justify the act, the court cannot further
weigh the adequacy of the need of the wisdom of the method.").
178. See Minn. Hous. Fin. Agency v. Hatfield, 210 N.W.2d 298, 307-08 (Minn. 1973)
(holding the construction of low and moderate income housing by nonpublic agencies is a
valid public purpose); City of Pipestone v. Madsen, 178 N.W.2d 594, 603-04 (Minn. 1970)
(holding that construction of industrial facilities in a blighted area and leased on a long
term lease to a private corporation is a public purpose); Visina v. Freeman, 89 N.W.2d 635,
649-50 (Minn. 1958) (holding the construction of port facilities might have some private
benefits, but primarily served a public purpose); Cent. Lumber Co. v. City of Waseca, 188
N.W. 275, 275 (Minn. 1922) (holding that the operation of a lumber and coal yard is a pub-
lic purpose); Citizens for More Important Things v. King County, 932 P.2d 135, 137 (Wash.
1997) (holding that the expenditure of public funds on preconstruction costs to build a
sports stadium is a public purpose).
179. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Burns, 198 So. 2d 1, 4-5 (Fla. 1967) (holding that disbursement
of state funds to the non-profit organization was not permissible because it was an inci-
dental, rather than primary, benefit to the public).
180. Foster v. N.C. Med. Care Comm'n, 195 S.E.2d 517, 527 (N.C. 1973) (emphasis
added) (holding that the expenditure of public money to finance a not-for-profit hospital
was not a public purpose within the meaning of the constitution).
181. Constitutional restrictions on pledging the state's credit for private purposes be-
gan emerging in the mid-1800s in reaction to many failed state-financed private ventures.
For a general discussion of the history of this constitutional prohibition in Maryland, see
Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Williams, 86 A.2d 892 (Md. 1952).
182. TENN. CONST. art. II, § 31.
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Other state constitutions contain similar restrictions.18 3 Dis-
putes concerning such restrictive provisions tend to dovetail with
the "public purpose" requirement; that is, the credit of a state
cannot be pledged to benefit private interests any more than tax
revenue can be diverted to private ventures. However, there is no
fixed standard of what constitutes a pledge of state credit for a
non-public benefit.184 Consequently, state courts have taken a
fairly liberal view in resolving such cases and have found that it
is permissible to issue public debt to finance safety improvements
in nursing homes,185 parks and stadiums,186 and private redeve-
lopment. 187
2. Limitations on Spending and Taxing
Although related to the state legislature's appropriation power,
spending and taxing limits are discrete because they impose
substantive restrictions on the ability of the legislature to gener-
ate revenue and to spend revenue. In the latter part of the twen-
tieth century, initiatives in various states imposed a series of con-
stitutional restrictions on the legislatures' authority to tax and
183. See IND. CONST. art. 10, § 5 ("No law shall authorize any debt to be contracted, on
behalf of the State, except in the following cases: To meet casual deficits in the revenue; to
pay the interest on the State Debt; to repel invasion, suppress insurrection, or, if hostili-
ties be threatened, provide for the public defense."); MO. CONST. art. III, § 37 ('"The general
assembly shall have no power to contract or authorize the contracting of any liability of
the state, or to issue bonds therefore ...."); PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 8 ("The credit of the
Commonwealth shall not be pledged or loaned to any individual, company, corporation or
association nor shall the Commonwealth become a joint owner or stockholder in any com-
pany, corporation or association.").
184. Many state courts distinguish lending the state's money from lending the state's
credit. See State ex rel. Wis. Dev. Auth. v. Dammann, 280 N.W. 698, 715 (Wis. 1938) (hold-
ing "that the giving or loaning of the credit of the state ... occurs only when such giving or
loaning results in the creation by the state of a legally enforceable obligation on its part to
pay to one party an obligation incurred or to be incurred in favor of that party by another
party"); see also Fairbank v. Stratton, 152 N.E.2d 569, 570, 573 (Ill. 1958) (holding that
the state treasurer could lawfully purchase revenue bonds issued by the Metropolitan Fair
and Exposition Authority, as this constituted a loan, not the pledging of the state's credit).
For an extensive discussion on the difference between lending state money and pledging
state credit, see Utah Tech. Fin. Corp. v. Wilkinson, 723 P.2d 406 (Utah 1986).
185. See Tosto v. Pa. Nursing Home Loan Agency, 331 A.2d 198, 202 (Pa. 1975).
186. See Kelly v. Marylanders for Sports Sanity, Inc., 530 A.2d 245, 257 (Md. 1987);
Libertarian Party of Wis. v. State, 546 N.W.2d 424, 440 (Wis. 1996).
187. See Utah Hous. Fin. Agency v. Smart, 561 P.2d 1052, 1055-56 (Utah 1977); see
also State ex rel. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Zupancic, 581 N.E.2d 1086, 1089 (Ohio 1991)
(holding that construction of low income rental housing was construction for industry and
commerce, and thus permissible under the constitution).
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spend in order to restrict the growth of state government.18 8 The
restrictions generally followed one of two patterns: (1) specific
spending limits1 8 9 or (2) limits on the legislatures' taxing pow-
er. 190 In some states, the two methods were combined.i9i Addi-
tional limitations included requirements that revenue collections
exceeding constitutionally permissible spending levels be re-
funded,192 and that any proposed tax in excess of a constitutional-
ly specified limit be approved by voters.1 93 Some states also im-
posed restrictions on the legislatures' authority to shift spending
obligations to units of local governments as a means of circum-
venting voter-imposed spending limits.1 94 Combined with ba-
lanced budget requirements, these restrictions became potent li-
mitations on state legislatures and their spending and taxing
powers. 195 In some cases, they contributed to budget crises as
revenues declined in hard economic times and state obligations
grew disproportionate to the revenue available.196 Restrictions
have also contributed to significant litigation in those states hav-
ing such limitations.197
188. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20(7)-(8).
189. See, e.g., MO. CONST. art. X, § 20.
190. See, e.g., id. § 18(a).
191. See, e.g., id. §§ 18(a), (20); see also COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20.
192. See, e.g., MO. CONST. art. X, § 18(b); OR. CONST. art. IX § 14(3).
193. See, e.g., MO. CONST. art. X, § 18(e)(1).
194. See, e.g., id. § 21.
195. See, e.g., David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARv. L. REV. 2544,
2638-39 (2005). They also arguably spurred "creative" financing of state programs and
projects to circumvent the limitations, at times added by state courts. See NICHOLAS
JOHNSON ET. AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, COLORADO'S FISCAL PROBLEMS
HAVE BEEN SEVERE AND ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE: COLORADO'S STRINGENT "TABOR"
LIMIT HAS WORSENED THE PROBLEMS 4 (2004), http://www.cbpp.org/3-17-O4sfp.pdf.
196. See Ronald K. Snell, Nuts and Bolts of TABOR, STATE LEGISLATURES, Jan. 2005,
at 24, 24-25, available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/pubs/slmag/2005/05SLJanCoTa
borAmendment.pdf.; see also Super, supra note 195, at 2638-39.
197. A discussion of the extent of the litigation involving taxing and spending limits is
beyond the scope of this article. However, in states having such limits, significant litiga-
tion has arisen concerning the definition of various terms, the nature of ballot language to
increase or decrease taxes, and the extent to which the limits apply to alternative legisla-
tive funding schemes. See, e.g., Submission of Interrogatories on Senate Bill 93-74, 852
P.2d 1, 15 (Colo. 1993) (holding that the state constitution prohibits the general assembly
from limiting revenues collected by the gaming commission, but that the general assembly
could decrease revenues collected elsewhere or refund the surplus to taxpayers).
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3. The Bill Enacting Process-The Single Subject Rule
Many state constitutions require that a bill embrace but one
subject, the so-called "single subject rule."198 The rule was de-
signed to prevent the combining of non-germane measures into
one bill-measures that would not otherwise pass on their own
merit and thus required the political advantage of being com-
bined with more popular measures. 199 In Michigan, the practice
was known as "logrolling."200 Minnesota courts have referred to
such bills as "Christmas tree[s]."201 In other states, specific case
names have been used to describe the practice, such as in Mis-
souri, where a multiple non-germane subject bill is described as
having a "Hammerschmidt problem."202 The single subject rule is
supported by the corollary principle in some states that "no bill
shall be so amended in its passage through either house as to
change its original purpose."203
Over the years, state courts have faced numerous challenges to
various legislative measures on the grounds that the enacting
process violated the single subject rule. Courts in many states
have taken a fairly liberal view of the single subject rule, holding
that to meet the requirement the contents of a bill need only have
a general relationship to the bill's title.204 Consequently, state
legislatures have historically enjoyed relative freedom in con-
structing the title and contents of bills, and state courts have ar-
guably aided and abetted lax compliance with this constitutional
198. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. III, § 5, para III; LA. CONST. art. III, § 15(A); MINN.
CONST. art. IV, § 17; see also Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the Legislative
Process, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 803, 822 fig.2 (2006).
199. People ex rel. Drake v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481, 494 (1865).
200. Rohan v. Detroit Racing Ass'n, 22 N.W.2d 433, 444 (Mich. 1946).
201. State ex rel. Mattson v. Kiedrowski, 391 N.W.2d 777, 785 (Minn. 1986) (Yetka, J.
concurring) ("A Christmas tree bill has normally been referred to, in legislative jargon, as
a bill so drafted as to give a number of legislators approval of their separate or pet projects
in order to gather sufficient votes to pass it.").
202. See S. 91-76, 2d Sess., at 1860 (Mo. 2002), available at http://www.senate.mo.gov/
02info/journals/Day76.htm. (referencing Hammerschmidt v. Boone County, 877 S.W.2d 98,
102 (Mo. 1994) ("Consistent with these rules of construction, the words 'one subject' must
be broadly read, but not so broadly that the phrase becomes meaningless.")).
203. MO. CONST. art. III, § 21.
204. Johnson v. Harrison, 50 N.W. 923, 924-25 (Minn. 1891). Minnesota courts have
gone so far as to hold that the provisions of a bill need only have a "filament" of commonal-
ity with the title. Blanch v. Suburban Hennepin Reg'l Park Dist., 449 N.W.2d 150, 155
(Minn. 1989).
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limitation. 205 In so doing, state judiciaries have avoided direct
confrontation with state legislatures over what many legislators
view as a matter exclusively connected to the internal legislative
process, notwithstanding the explicit terms of a constitution. 206
Not all state courts, however, have been willing to concede that
the contents of legislative acts need only be tied together by a fi-
lament. Consequently, state courts have struck down laws related
to sentencing guidelines, 207 revenue, 208 administrative rule-
making by state agencies, 209 zoning and ethics and election
reform, 210 economic development and livestock indemnifica-
tion,211 allocation of space in a state capitol and water rights,212
crime, 213 and tort reform.214 Even Minnesota, a state that histor-
ically applied one of the most liberal understandings of the single
subject rule, held in 2000 that the state legislature violated the
rule by including in a tax bill a requirement that laborers on cer-
tain construction projects be paid a prevailing wage.215 The single
subject rule stands as a pointed example of state constitutional
limitations that implicate not only the substance of legislative
power, but also the exercise of that power at its most elemental
level: the procedure of constructing legislation.
205. See, e.g., San Joaquin Helicopters v. Dep't of Forestry, 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 246, 251,
254 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (concluding that although an exemption from the Administrative
Procedure Act was enacted as part of a surplus property bill, the single subject rule was
not violated).
206. The Supreme Court of Ohio observed, "[T]his court has consistently expressed its
reluctance to interfere with the legislative process .... " State ex rel. Dix v. Celeste, 464
N.E.2d 153, 157 (Ohio 1984), limited by Simmons-Harris v. Guff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 216
(Ohio 1999) (modifying Dix "to ensure that it is not read to support the position that a
substantive program created in an appropriations bill is immune from a one-subject-rule
challenge as long as funds are also appropriated for that program"), rev'd 536 U.S. 639
(2002).
207. Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620, 622, 627 (Fla. 2000).
208. In re House Bill No. 1353, 738 P.2d 371, 372-74 (Colo. 1987).
209. Kincaid v. Mangum, 432 S.E.2d 74, 76, 82 (W. Va. 1993).
210. State v. Prince Georgians for Glendening, 617 A.2d 586, 587, 589 (Md. 1992).
211. Carmack v. Mo. Dep't of Agric., 945 S.W.2d 956, 957-59, 961 (Mo. 1997).
212. Johnson v. Walters, 819 P.2d 694, 695, 698 (Okla. 1991).
213. Johnson v. Edgar, 680 N.E.2d 1372, 1374-75, 1381 (Ill. 1997).
214. State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1097, 1101
(Ohio 1999).
215. Associated Builders & Contractors v. Ventura, 610 N.W.2d 293, 295, 302-03
(Minn. 2000).
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4. Special and Local Laws
There is no constitutional prohibition on Congress's power to
enact special laws. 216 By contrast, many state constitutions pro-
hibit legislatures from adopting special and local laws. 217 What
constitutes a prohibited special law has been the subject of signif-
icant litigation. A special law is generally defined as "one relating
to, or designed to operate upon, particular persons or things, or
one that purports to operate upon classified persons or things
when classification is not permissible or the classification adopted
is illegal."21s A local law is defined as "one relating to, or designed
to operate only in, a specifically indicated part of the state, or one
that purports to operate within classified territory when classifi-
cation is not permissible or the classification adopted is illeg-
al."219
The restriction on special and local laws serves two purposes.
First, it is intended to prevent an irregular system of laws that
lacks uniformity or grants special legal preferences to particular
classes or individuals. 220 Second, it is closely connected to the
concept that all residents of a state should enjoy equal protection
of law.221 Some states do permit special laws when a general law
216. See, e.g., Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No.
109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005). For a general discussion of this law, see Steven G. Calabresi,
The Terri Schiavo Case: In Defense of the Special Law Enacted by Congress and President
Bush, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 151 (2006). Cf. Arakaki v. Lingle, 423 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2005)
(noting that Congress could enact special laws to govern public lands in Hawaii), overruled
in part by Daniel Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 346 (2006).
217. See, e.g., City of S. Bend v. Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d 683, 684 (Ind. 2003).
218. State ex rel. Landis v. Harris, 163 So. 237, 240 (Fla. 1934) (citations omitted). The
Supreme Court of Missouri has defined a special law as one based on "immutable charac-
teristics" such as "historical facts, geography, or constitutional status." Tillis v. City of
Branson, 945 S.W.2d 447, 449 (Mo. 1997). A special law is facially unconstitutional and
the party defending the law must demonstrate "substantial justification" for the disparate
treatment. See O'Reilly v. City of Hazelwood, 850 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Mo. 1993).
219. Harris, 163 So. at 240 (citations omitted); see also Keiderling v. Sanchez, 572 P.2d
545, 546-47 (N.M. 1977).
220. See Sherwood Sch. Dist. v. Wash. County Educ. Serv. Dist., 6 P.3d 518, 523-24
(Or. Ct. App. 2000) (articulating the purpose of the special law restriction in Oregon). The
reasons articulated by the Oregon court are generally applicable to all states with such
limitations.
221. See County of Bureau v. Thompson, 564 N.E.2d 1170, 1181 (Ill. 1990) (holding
that "a law is an unconstitutional special law if there is no rational explanation for why
that law cannot be applied to all persons or entities in the State"); Bilyk v. Chi. Transit
Auth., 531 N.E.2d 1, 3 (111. 1988) (stating that a person or class of persons is denied equal
protection when a statute arbitrarily discriminates against that person or class of persons
by withholding a benefit or privilege which the state gives to all others).
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is not appropriate. 222 In some states, courts give a narrow inter-
pretation to such constitutional restrictions while giving great de-
ference to a legislature's classification of its acts. 223 In other
states, courts have read the restriction less deferentially, holding
that a special law is presumptively invalid in the absence of sig-
nificant evidence that a general law does not apply.224
Florida courts have been particularly vigilant in this area, ob-
serving that "we must also recognize that ... the Legislature is
constitutionally barred from passing general laws that impact on-
ly specific parties or areas of the state unless constitutional re-
quirements are met."225 The Supreme Court of Florida has struck
down numerous legislative acts, finding in one instance that a
"general statute" was so narrowly tailored to a specific location
that it constituted a special law adopted for the benefit of a par-
ticular entity. 226 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Missouri struck
down a general law creating special boundary commissions, find-
ing the law so narrowly tailored that it could only apply to certain
areas of the state, to the exclusion of the rest of the state.227 Ad-
ditionally, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma struck down a law
that conditioned the filing of a medical malpractice action on the
plaintiff filing an affidavit of merit. 228 In so doing, the court
found that the statutory requirement as applied to medical mal-
practice plaintiffs was "underinclusive and special," in effect sin-
gling out a discrete set of tort litigants and imposing on them dis-
tinctive requirements as a precondition to accessing the courts.229
222. See e.g., UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 26; State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 265 (Utah 1986)
(holding the constitution permits special laws in limited circumstances to achieve reason-
able and legitimate state ends).
223. See Med. Soc'y of S.C. v. Med. Univ. of S.C., 513 S.E.2d 352, 357 (S.C. 1999) (hold-
ing a law is not unconstitutional as a special law "unless its repugnance to the
[c]onstitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt").
224. See Harris v. Mo. Gaming Comm'n, 869 S.W.2d 58, 65 (Mo. 1994) (holding that a
"party defending [a] facially special statute must demonstrate a 'substantial justification'
for the special treatment").
225. Fla. Dep't of Bus. & Prof l Regulation v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n, 967 So. 2d
802, 808 (Fla. 2007).
226. St. Vincent's Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Mem'l Healthcare Group, Inc., 967 So. 2d 794, 801-
02 (Fla. 2007).
227. O'Reilly v. City of Hazelwood, 850 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Mo. 1993). The court also noted
that under the Missouri constitution, "no special law may take effect 'where a general law
can be made applicable."' Id. at 99 (quoting MO. CONST. art. III, § 40(30)).
228. Zeier v. Zimmer, Inc., 152 P.3d 861, 862-63 (Okla. 2006).
229. Id. at 868. The court also found that the provisions of the statute acted as a mone-
tary bar to access to the courts in violation of the open courts provisions of the state consti-
tution. See id. at 869.
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Other state courts have found similar legislative acts unconstitu-
tional as special laws.230
C. Initiative and Referendum
Many state constitutions provide for a direct voter check on leg-
islative power known as initiative and referendum.231 No discus-
sion concerning limitations on state legislative power is complete
without at least a passing reference to these processes. Initiative
and referendum involve two separate means of constitutional li-
mitation on legislative power. Initiative allows voters to adopt di-
rectly constitutional amendments and laws, disregarding the tra-
ditional legislative process. 232 Referendum allows voters to repeal
legislative acts or permits the legislature to refer specific legisla-
tive or constitutional matters directly to the voters.233 Initiative
and referendum buttress the proposition that state legislative
power derives from the people not by delegation, but subject to
limitation. As the Supreme Court of Arizona observed,
Although our constitution vests legislative authority "in a Legisla-
ture, . . the people reserve the power to propose laws and amend-
ments to the Constitution and to enact or reject such laws and
amendments at the polls, independently of the Legislature; and they
230. See, e.g., Keiderling v. Sanchez, 572 P.2d 545, 547 (N.M. 1977) (holding that a law
creating special judicial disqualifications provisions for a specific district is unconstitu-
tional); Pa. Tpk. Comm'n v. Commonwealth, 899 A.2d 1085, 1087 (Pa. 2006) (holding that
a law singling out the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission and mandating collective bar-
gaining is unconstitutional); City of South Bend v. Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d 683, 684, 697 (Ind.
2003) (holding that a law creating special annexation procedures for limited communities
is unconstitutional).
231. Twenty-seven states have some form of initiative and referendum. See INITIATIVE
AND REFERENDUM INSTITUTE, STATE-BY-STATE LIST OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM
PROVISIONS, http://www.iandrinstitute.org/statewidei&r.htm (last visited Dec. 11, 2008).
Two states allow initiative of constitutional amendments only. See id. Three states have
referendum only. See id. It is generally accepted that South Dakota was the first state to
adopt the initiative and referendum process. Nathaniel A. Persily, Comment, The Peculiar
Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the Initiative, Referendum and Recall Developed in
the American West, 2 MICH. L. & POLY REV. 11, 16 (1997).
232. WILLIAM J. KEEFE & MORRIS S. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS:
CONGRESS AND THE STATES 52 (8th ed. 1993). Initiative has two subcomponents: (1) citi-
zens can initiate a constitutional change through a ballot measure, or (2) citizens can in-
itiate substantive legislation through a ballot measure. See id.
233. See id. at 52-53. Referendum has two subcomponents: (1) citizens can seek to re-
peal an act of the legislature, or (2) the legislature can refer a matter to a vote of the
people. See id.
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also reserve ... the power to approve or reject at the polls any Act, or
item, section, or part of any Act of the Legislature."2 34
Many state constitutions give legislatures some control over
the process of initiative and referendum in order "to secure the
purity of elections, and guard against abuses of the elective fran-
chise."235 A legislature's authority to adopt legislation directed at
regulating the initiative and referendum process must be ba-
lanced against the particular right reserved by the people. Regu-
latory legislation must 'facilitate the operation' [of the
process]" 2 3 6 and may not create unreasonable barriers or inter-
fere with the reserved power. 237 State courts thus find them-
selves balancing the legislature's constitutional obligation to se-
cure the integrity of the electoral process with a right specifically
reserved by the people to directly reject legislative acts or to in-
itiate substantive changes to the law independent of the legisla-
ture. 238
V. CONCLUSION
Throughout the history of the United States, the policy func-
tion of the judiciary has been analyzed largely through the role
that federal courts have played in governing the nation. Little at-
tention has been paid to the unique function that state courts
play in this arena, or the many and varied state constitutional
provisions that implicate both the legislative policymaking
process and judicial review of that process. This lack of attention
not only underrates the significant contribution of state courts in
resolving many pressing policy questions, but it also discounts
234. Fairness & Accountability in Ins. Reform v. Greene, 886 P.2d 1338, 1340-41 (Ariz.
1994) (quoting ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1).
235. See WYo. CONST. art. 6, § 13.
236; See Nevadans for Prop. Rights v. Heller, 141 P.3d 1235, 1240 (Nev. 2006) (quoting
NEV. CONST. art. 19, § 5).
237. See State ex rel. Stenberg v. Moore, 602 N.W.2d 465, 475-77 (Neb. 1999) (holding
a law requiring an exact match of signatures placed on initiative petitions with the voter
registration records unconstitutional because it did not facilitate the process or prevent
fraud, but rather frustrated the ability of the public to engage in the initiative process).
238. Laws adopted by initiative can generally be repealed by the state legislature.
However, a state legislature may not interfere with the right of the people to initiate legis-
lation where that right is reserved in the constitution. See Gibbons v. Cenarrusa, 92 P.3d
1063, 1068 (Idaho 2002) (Kidwell, J., concurring) ("A proposed initiative cannot be
amended, reviewed, or thwarted by the legislature. The initiative power is reserved to the
people and is to be exercised without intrusion by the legislature. It is this power reserved
to the people that this Court must adamantly preserve and protect.").
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the principle that state courts perform a different policy function.
That function is fundamentally to ensure that virtually unlimited
state legislative power remains within the prescribed bounds es-
tablished by the voters. While choruses of scholars, observers,
and pundits have mounted either a spirited defense of judicial re-
view or a spirited repudiation of the principle, few have consi-
dered the matter within the context of the role of state courts.239
Both opponents and proponents of judicial review center their ar-
guments on the federal judiciary and extend these arguments to
emerging debates in the states, without contextualizing the exer-
cise of state judicial power within the constitutional framework of
each state. Perhaps this has much to do with the public's errone-
ous perception that the nation's primary judicial power is vested
at the federal level. Perhaps it has to do with the stature given to
federal courts. Or perhaps it has to do with the inherent conflict
between the judiciary's fundamental power in the system of
checks and balances, and its seemingly anti-democratic approach
to resolving policy questions. 2 40
Judicial review in the states is framed by legitimate voter in-
terest in imposing limitations on largely unlimited legislative
power. To frame the current debate on the role of the judiciary in
policy matters without distinguishing its exercise in the states
makes for easy accusations of judicial abuse, and perpetuates a
rather monolithic and minimalistic appreciation of the diversity
of the American judiciary and the various constitutional regimes
that voters have chosen for their states. There is not one constitu-
tional system in the United States any more than there is one ju-
risprudential tradition. Rather, there are multiple systems and
traditions, each presenting a peculiar set of cultural, legal, and
239. See Judges in the Culture Wars Crossfire, 91 ABA J., Oct. 2005, at 44, 46-47. Pro-
fessor Michael Tigar stated,
Well, I think the biggest threat to judicial independence is once again the ex-
ecutive branch of government. We have a situation in which the executive
branch has, first, decided to trivialize the obligations of the United States
under treaties such as the Geneva Convention and then, systematically ...
prevent[ed] judicial oversight of the rights of people who are subject to ac-
tions such as detention and torture. And it has compounded that by being
less than candid with the courts.
Id. Professor John McGinnis noted, "Beginning with the Warren court, the judiciary
has, at least in some decisions, erased the difference between legislation and inter-
pretation." Id. at 46.
240. This proposition ignores the fact that the overwhelming number of judges in the
United States are elected in some form. See JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES, supra
note 132.
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structural dynamics. The policy role of state judiciaries, framed
by considerations flowing from their respective constitutions,
produces a rich diversity of governing. It is unfortunate that in
the current polemic debates over the role of courts in governing
the nation, the variety of unique principles and structures ema-
nating from the states is not valued as a critical attribute of fede-
ralism and an important qualifier in considering the proper policy
role of America's courts.

